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One of the main issues at the forefront of higher education policy discussions 
in the last decade concerns the under-representation of low-income and minority 
students at our nation’s more selective colleges and universities.  This dissertation 
focuses on this issue by examining the factors that impact on the college application 
decisions of low-income and minority students, as well as their success in selective 
colleges and universities after matriculation and finally by investigating how the use 
of merit-based financial aid programs affects the representation of low-income and 
minority students and other institutional spending patterns.   
The first essay uses the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth: 1997 to 
examine how the distance from one’s home to the nearest selective college or 
university affects a student’s decision to apply to a selective college or university.  
Students that live near to a selective colleges or university may be more likely to apply 
to this type of institution, both because of the lower costs, and also possibly due to 
increased knowledge of the opportunities available at this type of college.  The results 
show that as distance to a selective college decreases, students are more likely to apply 
to one, and not necessarily the closest one.  Colleges may be able to increase the 
representation of low-income students in their application pools by increasing the 
information available to students living far away from any selective institutions. 
The second essay examines the success of low-income and minority students 
after they enroll at elite colleges and universities.  I use the restricted access versions 
of the National Longitudinal Survey of Freshmen and the National Education 
Longitudinal Study of 1988 to examine how institutional fit, both academic and social, 
impact educational outcomes such as GPA, persistence and college major choice.  I 
find that on average, minorities and students from low-income families achieve lower 
grade point averages and are less likely than other students to graduate within 6 years.  
Poor academic fit can negatively impact grades, but has little effect on persistence.  
Income peer group size does not affect grades or persistence, but does play a role in 
college major choice. Same race peer group size influences grades and persistence in 
addition to affecting college major choice.   
 The third essay focuses on the increased use by private colleges and 
universities of financial aid based on “merit”, as opposed to based solely on financial 
need.  Using data from the College Board’s Annual Survey of Colleges and other 
secondary data sources I examine how the increased use of merit aid impacts upon the 
socioeconomic and demographic composition of student bodies, and how faculty 
salaries, tuition costs, and the use of adjunct faculty members changes after a change 
to a merit-aid policy.  Results show that the percentage of students from low-income 
and minority families decreases following the introduction of merit-aid, and several 
institutional expenditure and student cost categories also change.  
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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
One of the issues currently at the forefront of higher education policy 
discussions centers on how to address the under-representation of low-income and 
minority students in our nation’s colleges and universities, particularly at the more 
selective of these institutions.  Studies have shown that there is an ample supply of 
high test score low-income and minority students available, but average four-year 
college enrollments of these students do not reflect this.  This is a concern not only as 
a question of equal access to higher education for deserving students of all 
backgrounds, but because research has shown that there is a wage benefit associated 
with graduating from a more selective institution and that this benefit is larger for low-
income and minority students.   
 A number of selective colleges and universities, both public and private, have 
introduced programs targeting low-income students through the use of increased 
financial aid.  Many of these programs also include increased recruitment efforts.  For 
these policies to be fully successful, policymakers must have a good understanding of 
the factors that are important in the application and enrollment decision for low-
income and minority students.   
 The second chapter of this dissertation focuses on the decision to apply to a 
selective college or university, and examines how particular factors may differ in their 
importance and impact on application decisions of low-income students.  This chapter 
uses a nationally representative data set, the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth, 
1997, to examine how proximity to a selective college during high school can impact 
on college application decisions.  Low-income students live significantly farther away 
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from selective colleges and universities, as most of these institutions are concentrated 
in the Northeast while low-income students are not.  Living near to a selective college 
may increase application rates to this type of institution for two reasons.  Close 
proximity lowers the convenience and cost of attendance as students can commute 
more easily, and it might also provide more information to students on the 
opportunities available at selective colleges and universities.  This chapter examines 
how the distance to the closest selective college or university impacts a student’s 
decision to apply to a selective institution.  The results from this chapter will help 
programs aimed at increasing the representation of low-income students in selective 
college applicant pools by highlighting how admissions offices can target these 
students.   
 Although many of the current policies are focusing on the first step of the 
process, enrolling low-income and minority students in college, it may also be 
important to examine what happens to these students after matriculation.  Low-income 
and minority students may face some hurdles at selective institutions.  Students of 
both groups have lower test scores on average, placing those attending selective 
colleges in the lower tail of the test-score distribution.  Additionally, due to the low-
representation of low-income and minority students at these colleges, these students 
have fairly small peer groups as defined by income or race, which could impact on 
educational outcomes through the formation of their social networks.   How well a 
student matches academically and socially with the institution they attend may impact 
on their educational success.  Chapter three examines how institutional fit impacts on 
college success using two longitudinal data sets, the National Longitudinal Survey of 
Freshmen and the National Education Longitudinal Study of 1988.  Administrators 
and policymakers can hopefully use the results of this study to get a sense of how well 
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students of these two groups are succeeding at selective colleges and universities, and 
if there are problems that could be addressed by policy.   
 In addition to the policies specifically focusing on low-income and minority 
students, there are many recent changes in institutional policies that could have 
important consequences for the enrollment of these students.  Over the last decade 
many private four-year colleges and universities have started awarding merit-based 
financial aid, as opposed to awarding financial aid based solely on need.  This move 
has come under fire as many feel that diverting financial aid resources away from 
need-based aid to merit-based awards that are more likely to go to higher-income 
students will lead to a crowding-out of low-income students at these colleges.  In a 
time when there is a focus on increasing the representation of these students, it is 
important to understand how policies such as a merit-aid policy can impact on this 
goal.   
 Chapter four examines how the enrollments of low-income and minority 
students change following the introduction of a merit aid program at private four-year 
institutions using data from the College Board’s Annual Survey of Colleges.  One of 
the main motivations for switching to merit-based aid is the desire to attract and enroll 
more high-test score students.  This chapter investigates how successful merit aid 
programs have been at increasing the quality of the student body.  In addition to 
diverting financial aid resources from need-based aid, it is possible that colleges use 
other avenues to fund their new merit aid programs.  Colleges may raise the tuition 
and fees that students face in order to recoup their losses, or they may change their 
spending in other areas, such as on faculty salaries and employment.  As many private 
colleges, and recently the more selective of these institutions, move to financial aid 
based not solely on need, but also on merit, it is important to understand what 
institutional policies follow this policy change.  
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 The three main chapters of this dissertation examine three aspects of one 
current policy issue, the under-representation of low-income and minority students at 
selective colleges and universities.  Hopefully the results of these three studies will be 
helpful to policymakers, administrators and researchers interested in understanding 
how to increase the representation of these students at our nation’s selective colleges, 
how other policies may impact upon this goal, and also how to ensure that they 
succeed academically after matriculation. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
CAN’T GET THERE FROM HERE: THE DECISION TO APPLY TO A 
SELECTIVE COLLEGE1 
 
I. Introduction 
 
 This paper examines the factors that are important during the college 
application process, with a specific focus on the roles of family income and proximity 
of selective schools on the decision of whether to apply to a selective college.  It 
employs a very rich national longitudinal data set with sample members applying to 
college in the early 2000s. 
Attending a selective four-year college can impact relative lifetime earnings 
(see, for example, Brewer, Eide, & Ehrenberg, 1999; Long, 2008), and the earnings 
premium may be larger for students from low-income backgrounds (Behrman, 
Constantine, Kletzer, McPherson, & Schapiro, 1996; Dale & Krueger, 2002).  Yet 
low-income students are under-represented at elite colleges and universities (Heller, 
2004; Hill, Winston & Boyd, 2005).  Bowen, Martin, Kurzweil and Tobin (2005), in 
their book Equity and Excellence in American Higher Education, show that only 11 
percent of students from families in the bottom quartile of the income distribution are 
enrolled at the 19 elite colleges and universities in their sample.  They argue that 
increasing the representation of students from low-income families has significant 
benefits, both in terms of increased social mobility for the low-income students 
                                                 
1
 This paper was co-written with Donna S. Rothstein of the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics.  It will be 
published in the Economics of Education Review (link to article: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.econedurev.2009.01.004). 
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themselves, and in terms of increased socioeconomic diversity within colleges, which 
has benefits for all students enrolled. 
Recently, a number of selective institutions have implemented programs aimed 
at increasing the representation of students from low-income families.  These 
programs, developed by both public and private elite institutions such as Harvard, 
Yale, Princeton, the University of Virginia, and the University of North Carolina, 
among others, are varied in their approaches.  However, most have at their core a 
promise to cover most or all of the school’s tuition for students with low family 
income.  Many programs also include attempts to increase awareness of the institution 
and the opportunities available there for low-income students.  The hope is that the 
various measures will lead to a larger applicant pool of low-income students at 
selective institutions, resulting in their higher representation in the matriculating 
classes.  Preliminary results from Harvard suggest that although effects of the program 
are modest thus far, it appears to be succeeding (Avery, Hoxby, Jackson, Burek, 
Poppe & Raman, 2006). 
To ensure that these programs can successfully target low-income student 
populations, one needs to examine why so few low-income students apply to more 
selective four-year institutions.  For according to a 2005 study by Hill, Winston and 
Boyd (2005) there is a sizeable pool of high ability, low-income students in the U.S. 
(as measured by test scores and reported family income).  Although the cost of 
attending a selective college or university can be quite high, tuition costs may not be 
the only hurdle that low-income students face.  Proximity to post-secondary 
institutions could be important in students’ college application decisions, and may be a 
more significant factor for low-income students.  About 46 percent of the more elite 
institutions in the U.S. are located in Northeastern states, yet many of the low-income 
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students that could attend these colleges are located in geographically distant states.2  
For example, in the data set we use in this paper, only 12 percent of students with a 
grade point average of 3.5 or more who are in families in the bottom quartile of 
income live in the Northeast.  
College proximity can have two distinct effects on college application 
decisions.  First, distance can impose costs and make students less likely to apply to 
colleges far away from their homes.  For example, students may want to attend college 
(and therefore will apply to colleges) close to home for convenience, lower travel 
costs, and for the option of living at home to avoid paying for room and board.  One 
might expect that financial reasons for attending a college closer to home may be more 
pressing for students from low-income families.   
Second, living close to a selective four-year college can expose students to 
what these colleges have to offer and encourage students to try to attend a selective 
four-year college.  Do (2004) refers to this as a spillover effect, which may be 
particularly influential for lower-income students.  For example, living close to a 
college may raise awareness of opportunities available at post-secondary institutions 
and help create a college-going expectation for nearby youths.  Living near a selective 
institution could have an additional spillover effect, increasing the probability that 
students would strive to attend a selective college or university.  Both effects suggest 
that as distance to a selective college increases, the less likely a student is to apply to 
one.   
In this paper, we use the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1997 
(NLSY97) to assess the roles of college proximity and family income in the decision 
to apply to a selective four-year college.  We analyze the college application decision 
                                                 
2
 We define elite or selective four year colleges as those ranked by Barron’s Profile of American 
Colleges (2001) as most or highly competitive. 
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using a bivariate probit model with selection.  The application process is shown in two 
stages:  (1) the choice to apply to a four-year college (selection), and (2) the choice to 
apply to any selective four-year college versus only non-selective four-year colleges.  
The selection model yields some interesting findings.  First youths from families with 
low income are much less likely to apply to four-year colleges than those from 
families with high income, even after controlling for test scores, high school grade 
point average, and many other family, school, and location characteristics.  Second, 
family income does not have an effect on the type of four-year colleges to which 
students applied.  And third, proximity to selective colleges does matter--students are 
less likely to apply to a selective four-year college the further they live from one.    
 
II. Prior literature 
 Several studies have focused on the college application decision, but few have 
focused on the decision to apply to a selective college or university.3  Recent studies 
have found mixed results on the importance of family income in the decision to apply 
to a selective college.  Two studies focusing on applications to a specific institution 
find contrasting results.  Desjardins, Dundar and Hendel (1999) examine the decision 
to apply to a large, high-quality public university in the Midwest.  Their findings 
indicate that students from low- and middle-income families are more likely to apply 
to the institution than students from high-income families.  Weiler (1994) looks at the 
decision to apply to a specific selective private institution in a suburban location.  He 
finds that as parental income increases, students are significantly more likely to apply 
to the focus institution.  Toutkoushian (2001) looks specifically at the application 
decisions of high school seniors in New Hampshire, and finds that low levels of 
                                                 
3
 See Hossler, Braxton and Coppersmith (1989) for a review of many of the earlier articles examining 
the college application decision. 
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parental income do not discourage students from applying to the more selective 
schools in the sample. 
In a very recent paper, Koffman and Tienda (2008) examine how a 1996 law in 
Texas (HB588), which guarantees admission to public colleges and universities in 
Texas to high school seniors graduating in the top 10 percent of their class, affected 
the distribution of socioeconomic status of the applicant pool to two Texas flagship 
public universities.  They find that the admission policy did little to change the 
application rate of students from poor high schools.  These results suggest that even 
with guaranteed admission there are still hurdles to overcome in order to increase the 
application rates of low-income students.  To remedy the situation, the authors 
advocate increased, targeted recruitment of top students from poor high schools.  But 
to do this, one must understand what factors are important to low-income students in 
their application decisions. 
 Very little research has looked at how student proximity to a college or 
university impacts his or her college application decisions.4  Turley (2009) is an 
exception.  She uses NELS:88 data to examine how college proximity influences the 
probability of applying to a two- or four-year college.  Turley measures college 
proximity as the number of colleges within commuting distance of a student’s home 
(12 miles for urban youths and 24 miles for rural/suburban youths).  She finds a very 
small increase in the probability of applying to a four-year college associated with a 1 
unit increase in the number of four-year colleges in close proximity.  These results 
suggest that college proximity influences the college application decision, but she does 
not look at college selectivity, which is the focus of the current paper. 
                                                 
4
 However, note that Card (1995) uses proximity to a four-year college as an instrument for years of 
schooling.  He finds that students living closer to four-year institutions, on average, attained higher total 
years of schooling. 
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 Two recent studies find that college proximity affects the college enrollment 
decision, and may have a larger effect for students from families with low income.  Do 
(2004), using data from High School and Beyond, examines college matriculation 
decisions for low- versus high-income students.  Results suggest that low-income 
students are more likely to attend a high quality college if they live near a good public 
university, with mixed results for the impact of living near other types of elite 
institutions.  Using a sample of Canadian high school seniors, Frenette (2006) finds 
that students who live further away from top universities are less likely to attend one 
and that the effect is significantly stronger for students from low-income backgrounds. 
 
III. Empirical approach 
 In order to investigate factors affecting college application choices, this study 
estimates a bivariate probit selection model (see, for example, Maddala, 1983).  The 
first (selection) stage is the decision of whether to apply to a four-year college vs. a 
two-year or no college.  The second stage, which is the main focus of our paper, is 
then whether to apply to any four-year selective college vs. only non-selective four-
year colleges.  The second stage is censored, in that the outcome is only observed for 
those who choose to apply to a four-year college. 
 Students have different portfolios of four-year college applications, and we 
reduce them to a 1 (at least one selective four-year college), 0 (only non-selective 
four-year colleges) dependent variable in the second stage.  Ideally, we would like to 
have a dependent variable that reflects the richness of the application choices.  
However, as we will see in the next section, only 237 students apply to any selective 
college in our data set, with 61 percent of these applying to only one selective college 
and another 22 percent applying to only two selective colleges. 
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We use two variables to identify the first stage of the bivariate probit selection 
model:  distance to a two-year college and the State unemployment rate.5  The theory 
behind the use of these variables to identify the selection process is as follows:  As the 
unemployment rate rises, parents and their children may steer away from expensive 
four-year colleges in favor of two-year colleges.  Two-year college proximity is likely 
to affect the two-year versus four-year college decision, but unlikely to have an effect 
on a student’s decision to apply to a selective versus a non-selective four-year 
institution.  In practice, we find that these two variables are statistically insignificant in 
the second stage. 
  Explanatory variables that may influence the college application decision are 
broken into five descriptive categories: 
(i.)  personal--gender, race, ethnicity, and test score; 
(ii.) family—income, parent education, family structure, and family size; 
(iii.) high school—type of institution, racial composition, and percent of low-
income  
students; 
(iv.) location—median income, urbanicity, region;  
(v.) distance—distance to college type. 
The rich data set used in this paper allows one to control for such an exhaustive list of 
characteristics.  The hope is that the effects of these variables can shed light on the 
college application decision, particularly the roles that college proximity and family 
income play in the process. 
 
 
                                                 
5
 State unemployment rate is from Table 572 of the 2001 edition of the Statistical Abstract of the United 
States. 
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IV. Data and variables 
 This paper employs the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1997 
(NLSY97) to study the college application decisions of youths in the U.S.  The 
NLSY97 consists of nearly 9,000 youths who were born in the years 1980-84.  The 
youths were 12-17 when first interviewed in 1997, and have had annual in-person 
interviews ever since.  In 2003 (round 7), the NLSY97 added a section on college 
choice for youths born in the years 1983 and 1984.  Youths who attended at least 
twelfth grade or received a GED report the colleges applied to in each application 
cycle, among other information.6  The survey repeated the section for the same two 
birth years in 2004.  The NLSY97 geocode CD and confidential data available to 
researchers who come to the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics provide college UnitIDs, 
high school id codes, as well as residential zip code, county, and state for each survey 
year.  The paper merges in high school characteristics from the Q.E.D. (Quality 
Education Data) and uses county of high school residence to link to information from 
the 2000 edition of the County and City Data Book. 
 The study obtains parent reports of household income from the round 1 
NLSY97 parent questionnaire.7  Family structure, household size, and biological 
mother’s education are also from round 1.  The NLSY97 defines race and ethnicity as 
three mutually exclusive groups:  non-black and non-Hispanic, black and non-
Hispanic, and Hispanic.  The survey oversamples the latter two groups.  ASVAB 
(Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery) test scores are available for about 80 
percent of the NLSY97 sample.  From the summer of 1997 through the spring of 1998, 
NLSY97 youths took the computer-adaptive version of the ASVAB.  Four of the 
                                                 
6
 The sample is limited to those with a high school diploma or GED in the analysis that follows. 
7
 Household income is missing for 25 percent of the youths in the NLSY97 sample, with about half due 
to a missing parent interview.  Descriptive statistics are shown for non-missing observations.  In the 
analyses that follow, variables with missing observations are given a value of zero, and a dummy 
variable for the missing variable is included in the regression. 
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subtests combine to form a composite measure of math and verbal aptitude.  This 
aptitude measure is similar to the Department of Defense’s Armed Forces 
Qualification Test (AFQT) score available in the NLSY79.  NLSY97 survey personnel 
internally normed these tests and created the composite math and verbal aptitude 
percentile score (0 (lowest) to 99) provided in the NLSY97 data set. 
  The paper uses college UnitIDs to merge in information on selectivity and 
other characteristics of colleges from the 2000 IPEDS and the College Board’s Annual 
Survey of Colleges.8  The rankings in Barron’s Profile of American Colleges (2001) 
are used to define selective colleges (those with a most or highly competitive ranking).  
In 2000, 146 U.S. colleges are considered to be selective by the Barron’s rankings.  
The average median SAT score is 1272 for the sample of selective institutions. 
 Finally, the study uses zip codes from a student’s senior year of high school 
and the complete list of selective four-year, non-selective four-year, and two-year 
colleges to create measures of college proximity.9  U.S. Gazetteer files from the U.S. 
Census Bureau provide the latitude and longitude of the centroid of each zip code in 
decimal degrees.  One can then convert decimal degrees to radians, and then calculate 
the distance in miles between the zip code of student i and the zip code of school j.10  
Once this is completed for all student and school zip code combinations, we use the 
minimum distance to each school type to define college proximity. 
 
 
 
                                                 
8
 We exclude for-profit colleges in our analysis.  At the time of the survey, for-profit schools were a 
very small part of the college application set.  We delete 27 observations in which the respondent only 
applied to for-profit four-year colleges.  Note that only 9 students who apply to public and private four-
year colleges in our final sample also apply to a for-profit college. 
9
 We exclude for-profit colleges from these measures. 
10
 The formula is 4000*arcos{sin(schoolj latitude)*sin(studenti latitude) + cos(schoolj 
latitutude)*cos(studenti latitude)*(cos(schoolj longitude – studenti longitude)}. 
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V. Descriptive statistics  
 Table 2.1 displays descriptive statistics for the NLSY97 sample, separated by 
type of school application and selectivity.  The categories are:  Did not apply, two-
year college, any four-year college, non-selective four-year college, and selective four-
year college.  The first three categories are mutually exclusive, and the last two are 
mutually exclusive subsets of the third column.  Students who apply to multiple types 
of school are placed in the highest category (for example, applications to both a non- 
selective four-year college and a selective four-year college place the student in the 
selective category).  On average, students who apply to at least one selective college, 
apply to 3.5 four-year colleges; the number is lower, 1.7, for those who apply to non-
selective four-year colleges. About 95 percent of students who apply to only non-
selective four-year colleges are accepted.  The number is much lower for the selective 
category (73 percent), reflecting the increased difficulty of acceptance at more 
selective four-year colleges. 
Table 2.1 indicates an under-representation of students from low-income 
families in the selective college applicant pool.  We divide household income into 
approximate quartiles based on Current Population Survey data of households with a 
12 to 17-year old youth present.11  Only about 14 percent of students in families with 
income under $25,000 apply to a selective four-year college, compared to over 46 
percent from families with income of at least $70,000.  Note that low-income students 
make up the largest share of those who apply to no college or apply to a two-year 
college only.   
A number of authors (for example, Bowen, et al., 2005) have noted the under-
representation of low-income, high ability students in the pool of students who apply 
                                                 
11
 See U.S. Census Bureau (1997).  Note that the NLSY97 round 1 parent interview asked parents to 
report income from calendar year 1996.   
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Table 2.1: Descriptive statistics, by type of college application 
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Did not 
apply 
Two-year 
college 
Any four-
year college 
Non-selective 
four-year 
college 
Selective 
four-year 
college 
Number of four-year 
college applications 
.000 
 
.000 
 
2.101 
(1.541) 
1.738 
(1.182) 
3.511 
(1.919) 
      
Selective college      
    Apply to any selective .000 .000 .205 .000 1.000 
    Accepted if applied ---- ---- .733 ---- .733 
      
Non-selective college      
     Apply to any .000 .000 .942 1.000 .717 
     Accepted if applied ---- ---- .961 .954 1.000 
      
Distance variables      
Distance to selective four-
year college 
105.033 
(186.407) 
86.934 
(125.703) 
88.833 
(148.251) 
97.747 
(158.855) 
54.192 
(88.663) 
      
Distance to non-selective 
four-year college 
10.600 
(13.178) 
10.861 
(13.359) 
9.658 
(16.361) 
10.190 
(17.425) 
7.591 
(11.106) 
      
Distance to two-year 
college 
12.463 
(19.603) 
9.633 
(12.732) 
11.544 
(15.291) 
12.381 
(16.386) 
8.290 
(9.286) 
      
Personal characteristics      
Female .454 .502 .548 .556 .519 
      
Black  .256 .244 .233 .255 .148 
      
Hispanic .249 .249 .124 .129 .105 
      
Math/verbal percentile 
score 
 
36.517 
(25.234) 
41.480 
(24.185) 
64.960 
(25.358) 
61.229 
(24.995) 
78.643 
(21.768) 
      
High school grade point 
avg. 
 
2.648 
(.733) 
2.792 
(.664) 
3.295 
(.601) 
3.218 
(.606) 
3.594 
(.477) 
Family characteristics      
Income < $25,000 .405 .327 .178 .189 .140 
 
     
Income ≥ $25,000 and < 
$45,000 
.252 
 
.293 
 
.233 
 
.251 
 
.167 
 
      
Income ≥ $45,000 and < 
$70,000 
.208 
 
.233 
 
.261 
 
.269 
 
.231 
 
      
Income ≥ $70,000 .135 .147 .327 .291 .462 
      
Biological mother's years 
of education 
11.844 
(2.539) 
12.285 
(2.875) 
13.922 
(2.797) 
13.743 
(2.739) 
14.615 
(2.915) 
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Table 2.1 Continued. 
Family size 
 
4.694 
(1.589) 
4.584 
(1.485) 
4.437 
(1.337) 
4.457 
(1.370) 
4.359 
(1.198) 
      
Both biological parents .469 .518 .651 .623 .759 
      
Biological parent + step. .166 .141 .100 .109 .068 
      
Biological mother only .288 .275 .202 .218 .139 
      
Biological father only .032 .029 .022 .024 .017 
      
High school characteristics    
Private .017 .012 .028 .018 .065 
      
Catholic .009 .030 .074 .062 .120 
      
Log(school size) 
 
6.945 
(.836) 
7.012 
(.774) 
7.004 
(.674) 
7.000 
(.670) 
7.022 
(.688) 
      
Student/teacher ratio 
 
17.026 
(5.861) 
17.520 
(5.963) 
16.583 
(5.152) 
16.518 
(4.892) 
16.846 
(6.088) 
      
% Black  
 
20.856 
(27.090) 
19.627 
(26.532) 
21.342 
(29.164) 
22.079 
(30.167) 
18.011 
(23.910) 
      
% Hispanic 
 
17.335 
(25.016) 
16.472 
(23.763) 
10.573 
(19.453) 
10.284 
(19.231) 
11.875 
(20.432) 
      
% Chapter I 
 
25.632 
(19.050) 
25.308 
(19.608) 
21.827 
(19.611) 
22.824 
(19.959) 
17.324 
(17.301) 
Location characteristics    
Urban .758 .773 .767 .746 .850 
      
Log median income in 
county 
10.486 
(.227) 
10.493 
(.222) 
10.531 
(.258) 
10.512 
(.259) 
10.605 
(.236) 
      
Midwest .218 .216 .254 .266 .207 
      
West .261 .304 .177 .172 .198 
      
South .359 .348 .370 .371 .367 
      
State unemployment rate 
 
4.065 
(.843) 
4.111 
(.772) 
3.890 
(.832) 
3.896 
(.842) 
3.866 
(.790) 
      
N 965 546 1158 921 237 
Note:  Means, standard deviations in parentheses.  Monetary values are in constant 1996 dollars.  
Distance is in miles.  Means exclude any missing observations.  Selective four-year college is 
defined as having a Barron’s Profile of American Colleges (2001) rating of most or highly 
competitive. 
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to selective schools.  We find this in the NLSY97 as well.  Suppose we limit our 
sample to those who scored in the 75th percentile or better on the math/verbal portion 
of the ASVAB.  Of these high-scoring youths who are from families in the bottom two 
quartiles of income, 65 percent apply to a four-year college, and of those, 25 percent 
apply to a selective four-year college.  In contrast, of high-scoring youths who are in 
the top quartile of family income, 85 percent apply to a four-year college, and of 
those, 40 percent apply to a selective four-year college.  Thus we see income 
differentials in the first stage decision—whether to apply to a four-year college at 
all—as well as in the second stage decision--whether to apply to a selective four-year 
college. 
Table 2.1 shows that, on average, youths who apply to a selective college have 
a significantly shorter distance to a four-year selective college than youths who apply 
to non-selective four-year colleges:  54 miles vs. 98 miles.  On average, students live 
significantly further from selective colleges than non-selective four- and two-year 
colleges.  This differential reflects the small number of selective colleges and 
universities in the U.S. and their geographic distribution.  For example, of the 146 
colleges rated as selective, 46 percent are in the Northeast and about 57 percent are in 
the Northeast and California.  To put this in perspective with respect to the NLSY97 
sample, youths in the Northeast live less than 19 miles from a selective college, on 
average, but those who live in the South or Midwest average about 95 miles, and those 
in the West average about 149 miles. 
The difference in average distance to a selective college also varies by income 
level.  For example, in the NLSY97 sample, students from families in the lowest 
quartile of income live an average of 95 miles from a selective college, but students 
from families in the highest quartile of income live an average of 87 miles from a 
selective college.  If instead, we look at a measure of whether a student has a selective 
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college within 50 miles of his or her high school residence, we find that 51 percent of 
students from low-income households have a selective college in close proximity 
compared to 63 percent of students from high-income households. 
 
VI. Results 
 Marginal effects from independent probits and a bivariate probit with selection 
for the probability of applying to any four year college and the probability of applying 
to a selective vs. non-selective four-year college are shown in Table 2.2.  The results 
from the two sets of equations are similar.  A Wald test cannot reject the null 
hypothesis that the equations are independent (p = .17).  Both variables used as 
exclusion restrictions are significant in the first stage.  Given the richness of the 
NLSY97 data, we are able to account for much of the heterogeneity between youths 
through covariates. 
 Family income has a large effect in the first stage, but no effect in the second 
stage.  This suggests that, all else equal (including test scores and high school grade 
point average), students with lower family incomes are less likely to be in the pool of 
applicants who apply to any type of four-year college.  However, given they get past 
this hurdle, low-income students are not any less likely to apply to a selective college.  
Relative to the highest income group, youths in families in the lowest income quartile 
are about 16 percentage points less likely to apply to any four-year college, those in 
the next lowest income quartile are about 9 percentage points less likely to apply, and 
those in the second to highest income quartile are about 7 percentage points less like to 
apply.  Policies that aim to increase the applicant pool of low-income students at elite 
four-year colleges may have to take into account that a number of these students are 
not applying to any four-year college.   
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 A number of background characteristics are significantly associated with the 
likelihood of applying to a selective college.  For example, students with higher 
aptitude, as measured by test scores, are significantly more likely to apply to a 
selective four-year college, relative to a non-selective four-year college.  High school 
grade point average has the same type of effect.  High school environment can play a 
major role in influencing students’ college choice, by preparing students academically 
and also possibly by providing information about the availability of opportunities at 
more selective institutions.  Students who attend private high schools are significantly 
more likely to apply to a selective college by about 16 percentage points.  Students 
from low-income families are much more likely to attend public high schools than 
their higher-income peers. 
 Longer distances to a selective college decrease the probability of applying to 
one.  The marginal effects from the bivariate probit suggest that a 75 mile increase in 
distance to a selective college (about half a standard deviation for the four-year 
application group) decreases the likelihood of applying to one by about 2 percentage 
points.  When we interacted distance with family income quartiles, we found that the 
distance effect does not vary with family income.  To get a feel for the magnitude of 
the distance effect, note that a .3 point increase in high school grade point average 
(about half a standard deviation for the four-year application group) increases the 
likelihood of applying to a four-year selective college by about 2.3 percentage points.  
Distance to the nearest non-selective college does not have a significant effect in either 
stage.  In addition, the distance to a two-year college has a positive effect in the first-
stage.  As the distance to the nearest two-year college increases, the likelihood of 
applying to a four-year college increases. 
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Table 2.2:  Four-year college vs. two-year or no college application and selective 
four-year college vs. non-selective four-year college application decisions, 
marginal effects from probits and bivariate probit with selection 
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 Probability of applying to a: 
 
Four-year 
college 
Selective 
college 
Four-year 
college 
Selective 
college 
 (probit) (probit) (bivariate probit) 
Distance variables    
Distance to selective four-year college 
 
-.010 a 
(.010) 
-.047*** a 
(.012) 
-.001 b 
(.001) 
-.026*** a 
(.008) 
     
Distance to non-selective four-year 
college 
-.001 
(.001) 
.001 
(.001) 
-.001 
(.001) 
.001 
(.001) 
     
Distance to two-year college 
 
.002** 
(.001) 
---- 
 
.002** 
(.001) 
---- 
 
    
Personal characteristics     
Female 
 
.046** 
(.022) 
-.033 
(.023) 
.044** 
(.022) 
-.020 
(.014) 
     
Black 
  
.163*** 
(.039) 
-.026 
(.038) 
.164*** 
(.039) 
-.021 
(.022) 
     
Hispanic 
 
.030 
(.039) 
-.047 
(.033) 
.027 
(.039) 
-.030* 
(.018) 
     
Math/verbal percentile score 
 
.067*** b 
(.001) 
.031*** b 
(.006) 
.068***b 
(.005) 
.016*** b 
(.004) 
      
High school grade point average 
 
.246*** 
(.017) 
.150*** 
(.023) 
.248*** 
(.017) 
.078*** 
(.012) 
     
Family characteristics     
Income < $25,000 
 
-.156*** 
(.038) 
.049 
(.050) 
-.156*** 
(.038) 
.038 
(.034) 
     
Income ≥ $25,000 and < $45,000 
 
-.093*** 
(.036) 
-.006 
(.034) 
-.092*** 
(.036) 
.002 
(.021) 
     
Income ≥ $45,000 and < $70,000 
 
-.069** 
(.035) 
-.041 
(.028) 
-.067* 
(.035) 
-.021 
(.016) 
     
Biological mother's years of education 
 
.033*** 
(.005) 
.003 
(.005) 
.034*** 
(.005) 
.001 
(.003) 
     
Both biological parents 
 
.140*** 
(.032) 
.042 
(.037) 
.141*** 
(.032) 
.021 
(.023) 
  
Biological mother only 
 
.077* 
(.042) 
.014 
(.053) 
.081** 
(.041) 
.005 
(.031) 
Biological father only 
 
.048 
(.072) 
-.062 
(.063) 
.055 
(.072) 
-.035 
(.031) 
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Table 2.2 Continued. 
High School characteristics    
Private 
 
.150* 
(.088) 
.256** 
(.109) 
.159* 
(.087) 
.163* 
(.089) 
     
Catholic 
 
.311*** 
(.062) 
.093* 
(.056) 
.311*** 
(.062) 
.043 
(.034) 
     
Log(school size) 
 
.046** 
(.019) 
-.022 
(.023) 
.049** 
(.019) 
-.018 
(.014) 
     
Student/teacher ratio 
 
.001 
(.002) 
.002 
(.002) 
.001 
(.003) 
.001 
(.002) 
     
% Black 
  
.001 
(.001) 
.002** 
(.001) 
.001 
(.001) 
.010** b 
(.005) 
     
% Hispanic 
 
-.001 
(.001) 
.003*** 
(.001) 
-.001 
(.001) 
.016*** b 
(.006) 
     
% Chapter I 
 
.003*** 
(.001) 
-.002** 
(.001) 
.003*** 
(.001) 
-.0015** b 
(.007) 
Location characteristics    
Urban 
 
.003 
(.030) 
.064*** 
(.024) 
.006 
(.030) 
.036** 
(.014) 
     
Log median income in county 
 
.062 
(.058) 
.096* 
(.055) 
.051 
(.058) 
.063* 
(.033) 
     
Midwest 
 
-.061* 
(.036) 
-.055* 
(.029) 
-.066* 
(.036) 
-.028 
(.017) 
     
West 
 
-.146*** 
(.040) 
.008 
(.041) 
-.144*** 
(.040) 
.005 
(.025) 
     
South 
 
-.064* 
(.034) 
.014 
(.033) 
-.064* 
(.034) 
.013 
(.021) 
     
State unemployment rate 
 
-.040** 
(.016) 
---- 
 
-.036** 
(.015) 
---- 
 
     
Rho (ρ) 
--- 
 
.998 
(.009) 
     
Log likelihood -1305.921 -474.027 -1777.749 
     
N 2669 1158 2669 
Robust standard errors in parentheses.  Conditional marginal effects are shown in the right-most 
column.  *, **, *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.   
a
 Marginal effect and standard error multiplied by 100.  b Marginal effect and standard error 
multiplied by 10. 
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To check the robustness of our key result regarding proximity to a selective 
college we create a number of alternative measures. The first set is for a 50-mile 
radius of the student’s high school zip code:  (1) the presence of a selective college 
within a 50-mile radius of the student’s high school zip code, (2) a series of mutually 
exclusive dummy variables that describe whether the respondent has 1, 2, or 3 or more 
selective four-year colleges within a 50-mile radius, and (3) the number of freshman 
slots at selective schools within the 50-mile radius divided by 1000.  The second set 
includes two mutually exclusive dummy variables for the presence of a selective 
college within a 50-mile radius and presence of a selective college between a 51- and 
100-mile radius, as well as (1) and (3) above defined for a 100-mile radius rather than 
50.  In addition to verifying that our results are robust, these alternative measures 
allow us to examine whether the effect of college proximity is non-linear.  On the one 
hand, students may only require one selective college within a certain radius to 
increase the likelihood that they will apply to one.  On the other hand, an increase in 
the number of selective colleges in close proximity, and freshmen slots at these 
colleges, may further raise the probability of applying to one. 
Table 2.3 shows college proximity marginal effects for selective colleges from 
six different probits of the probability of applying to any selective four-year college 
vs. only non-selective four-year colleges.12  The probits control for all of the 
background variables included in the second stage estimates in Table 2.2.  The results 
in Table 2.3 are very similar to those in Table 2.2:  close proximity to a selective 
college raises the likelihood of applying to one.  For example, having a selective 
college within a 50-mile radius increases the likelihood of applying to one by about 6 
percentage points.  Although it looks as though moving from having one to two  
                                                 
12
 Given our prior finding that we could not reject the null hypothesis that the first and second stage 
equations are independent, we estimate probits only.  However, the results are very similar when we 
estimate bivariate probits. 
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Table 2.3: Alternative selective four-year college proximity measures:  Selective 
four-year college vs. non-selective four-year college application decision, 
marginal effects from probits 
 Descriptive statistics Probit 
 
Four-year 
college 
Non-
selective 
four-year 
college 
Selective 
four-year 
college 
Pr(Apply to 
selective 
four-year 
college) 
Specification 1:  Have selective four-
year college within a 50-mile radius 
.592 
 
.559 
 
.717 
 
.059** 
(.026) 
     
Specification 2:  Have one selective 
four-year college within a 50-mile radius 
.205 
 
.193 
 
.249 
 
.056 
(.036) 
     
Have two selective four-year colleges 
within a 50-mile radius 
.098 
 
.091 
 
.122 
 
.096* 
(.050) 
     
Have three or more selective four-year 
colleges within a 50-mile radius 
.289 
 
.275 
 
.346 
 
.057 
(.039) 
     
Specification 3:  Number of selective 
four-year college slots within a 50-mile 
radius/1000 
3.147 
(4.480) 
 
2.920 
(4.360) 
 
4.027 
(4.825) 
 
.008* 
(.004) 
 
     
Specification 4:  Have selective four-
year college within a 50-mile radius 
 
.592 
 
.559 
 
.717 
 
.090*** 
(.030) 
     
Have selective four-year college within 
a 100 mile radius, but not a 50-mile 
radius 
.139 
 
.142 
 
.127 
 
.085* 
(.047) 
     
Specification 5:  Have selective four-
year college within a 100-mile radius 
.731 
 
.701 
 
.844 
 
.080*** 
(.025) 
     
Specification 6:  Number of selective 
four-year college slots within a 100-mile 
radius/1000 
6.852 
(7.943) 
 
6.435 
(7.846) 
 
8.474 
(8.126) 
 
.009*** 
(.003) 
 
     
N 1158 921 237 1158 
Note:  Means, standard deviations in parentheses in first three columns.  Marginal effects with robust 
standard errors in parentheses in last column.  Specifications include controls for personal, family, 
high school, and location characteristics.  *, **, *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively.   
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selective colleges within a 50-mile radius increases the likelihood of applying to one, 
these two effects are not statistically different.  The effect of the slots measure is 
modest--an increase in selective freshman slots within a 50-mile radius by 1500 (about 
one third of a standard deviation), increases the likelihood of applying to a selective 
college by 1.2 percentage points.  Interestingly, the effects of having a selective 
college within a 50-mile radius (potentially commuting distance) vs. only one within a 
100-mile radius are not statistically different.  In addition, the results from the last two 
specifications are similar to those that used the 50-mile radius.  The earlier finding of a  
negative and significant effect of distance to a selective college on the probability of 
applying to one appears robust to alternative proximity measures. 
 This paper has suggested two hypotheses about the effects of distance:  (1) 
distance imposes costs and makes students less likely to apply to colleges far away 
and (2) living close to a selective four-year college exposes students to what this type 
of college has to offer and encourages students to try to attend a selective four-year 
college.  It is difficult to differentiate between the two stories because both suggest the 
same sign in the college application equations:  as distance to a selective college 
increases, the less likely a student is to apply to one. 
 A pure distance cost story would suggest that students who live in close 
proximity to a selective college would apply to that one, rather than a selective college 
farther away.  This does not appear to be the case.  About 72 percent of students who 
applied to a selective college in the NLSY97 lived within 50 miles of a selective 
institution.  However, of these students, only 38 percent applied to the closest (give or 
take 25 miles), and in fact on average applied to institutions much further away.  We 
would expect the cost story to be more binding for lower-income students, but the 
number is very similar (39 percent) for students from families in the bottom two 
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quartiles of income.  The probit results using alternative measures of college 
proximity, shown in Table 2.3, also suggest that a true cost story may not fully explain 
the importance of distance.  For example, a pure distance cost story would suggest that 
having a selective college within 50 miles would increase the probability of applying 
to one more so than having one between 51 and 100 miles.  However, in specification 
(4) we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the effects are the same.  These findings 
suggest that distance costs alone do not appear to be driving the results for the most 
selective colleges. 
 Our results fit well with those of past studies.  We estimate a bivariate probit 
with selection to attempt to tease apart the impacts of factors affecting the decision to 
apply to a four-year college, and the decision to apply to any selective four-year 
college versus only non-selective four-year institutions.  After controlling for a wealth 
of covariates and selection, we find that family income on its own is not a deterrent to 
applying to a selective college.  These results are very similar to the findings of 
Toutkoushian (2001).  Our results build on Turley’s 2009 finding that college 
proximity impacts the likelihood of applying to a four-year college.  We find that 
selective college proximity also impacts the likelihood of applying to a four-year 
selective college.  We do not, however, find that proximity effects differ by family 
income, as found by Do (2004) and Frenette (2006) for the selective college 
enrollment decision.   
 Of course, we would be remiss not to mention that the application stage is only 
the first part of the puzzle of how to increase the representation of lower-income 
students at selective colleges.  Students must be accepted at a selective college and 
then ultimately enroll.  Do low-income students have similar acceptance rates to their 
high-income peers?  Bowen, Kurzweil, and Tobin (2005) suggest that they do within 
their sample of 19 selective colleges and universities.  We estimate some simple 
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probits to see whether income levels are related to the likelihood of being accepted at a 
four-year selective college, given the student applied to at least one.  We control for all 
of the same variables in the selective college choice equations shown in Table 2.2, 
including test score and high school grade point average.   
Our results indicate that students in the lowest income quartile are about 26 
percentage points less likely to be accepted at a selective four-year college relative to 
their peers in the highest income quartile.  The addition of a control for the number of 
selective college applications the student submitted causes the marginal effect to 
increase.  Clearly, we have a selection problem, in that we are conditioning our sample 
on students who apply to selective colleges.  In addition, the number of low-income 
students who apply to selective schools in the NLSY97 sample is low.  However, 
these results provide some suggestive evidence that even once low-income students 
get past the hurdle of applying to at least one selective college, something that very 
few low-income students do, they are less likely to be accepted.  Perhaps this is due to 
non need-blind admissions practices at some colleges.  If a student is on the margin for 
acceptance, perhaps some colleges take into account the amount of funding each 
student would require to enroll.  If this is occurring, lower-income students may be at 
a disadvantage at the acceptance stage.  Research using a larger data set could shed 
more light on this issue.  But the results here point to another potential reason for the 
under-representation of low-income students at selective colleges—lower acceptance 
rates. 
  
VII. Conclusion 
Low-income students are under-represented at selective four-year colleges and 
universities.  Remedying this problem could potentially increase social mobility for 
low-income students as well as boost socioeconomic diversity within colleges.  A 
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number of selective institutions have implemented programs aimed at increasing the 
representation of students from low-income families.  Most of these programs involve 
the lowering or elimination of tuition costs for qualified low-income students.  
However, tuition costs of college may not be the only hurdle facing these students.  
About 46 percent of the more selective institutions in the United States are located in 
Northeastern states, and many of the low-income students that could attend these 
colleges are located in geographically distant states.  Physical distance from a selective 
college may be an important issue to low-income students for both financial and non-
monetary reasons, such as convenience, travel costs, and the option of living at home.  
A nearby college or university may also provide spillover effects by raising awareness 
of opportunities available at colleges and creating a college-going expectation for 
nearby youths. 
 This paper uses data from the NLSY97 to analyze the relationship between 
various personal, family, school, and geographic background characteristics and the 
likelihood of applying to a selective four-year college or university.  Particular 
attention is paid to the influence of distance to selective colleges, and whether the 
effect differs for low-income students.  Basic means show that students who apply to 
selective four-year colleges live almost half as far from an elite institution as students 
who apply to non-selective four-year colleges.  In addition, a lower proportion of 
students from families in the lower two quartiles of income apply to a selective four-
year college compared to a non-selective four-year college. 
 We estimate a bivariate probit with selection.  The first stage (selection) is the 
probability of applying to any four-year college, and the second stage is the 
probability of applying to any four-year selective college vs. only non-selective four-
year colleges.  The results suggest that lower-income students are much less likely to 
apply to any four-year college.  However, income does not appear to impact the 
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likelihood of applying to a selective college.  Distance to a selective four-year college 
has a significant impact on the probability that a student will apply to a selective 
school.  As the distance to the closest selective college increases, students are less 
likely to apply to this type of college, all else equal.  Low-income students do not 
seem to be any more sensitive to distance than their high-income peers. 
 The findings from this paper can provide some suggestions for selective 
colleges that are trying to increase their representation of students from low-income 
families.  First, a number of high-test score students from low-income families are not 
applying to any four-year colleges.  As advocated by Koffman and Tienda (2008), 
increased recruitment of top students from poor high schools may be productive.  
Second, the geographic mismatch of low-income students and selective institutions 
appears to be a factor in the college application process.  Helping low-income students 
with travel costs and logistics may increase a school’s attractiveness.  In addition, 
educating students in lower-income and education areas that are far from any selective 
colleges about the opportunities available at selective colleges may be fruitful.  
Finally, it appears that, all else equal, low-income applicants to selective colleges are 
less likely to be accepted.  Future research that examines the acceptance decisions in 
more detail, as well as factors that affect enrollment behavior, can provide further 
insight into how to increase the representation of students from low-income families at 
selective four-year colleges and universities. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
DETERMINANTS OF GRADES, PERSISTENCE AND MAJOR CHOICE FOR 
LOW-INCOME AND MINORITY STUDENTS 
 
I. Introduction 
There has been a recent push by post-secondary institutions, policy-makers, 
and educational researchers, to address the issue of under-representation of high-
ability low-income students at our nation’s colleges and universities13.  This is in 
addition to the on-going push to increase enrollment of under-represented minorities at 
four-year colleges and universities.  Studies have found that there is a wage premium 
associated with graduating from an elite college or university, where the under-
representation of minority and low-income students is the most dramatic (see for 
example Brewer, Eide &Ehrenberg, 1999).  In particular, research has shown that low-
income students that graduate from a selective college or university enjoy a wage 
premium (Behrman, Constantine, Kletzer, McPherson & Schapiro, 1996; Dale and 
Krueger, 2002).  Increasing the number of low-income and minority students that 
receive degrees from elite colleges and universities therefore will increase lifetime 
earnings for these students, as well as possibly have benefits in terms of 
intergenerational income mobility.   
 Many individual post-secondary institutions have announced programs in the 
past few years, mostly financial aid based, aimed at attracting and enrolling more 
students from low-income backgrounds. Currently, the majority of these institutional 
                                                 
13There is a fairly sizeable population of low-income students in the U.S. with test scores high enough 
to attend selective institutions (Hill, et al., 2005).  However, students from the bottom of the income 
distribution make up a much smaller percentage of the student bodies at the most selective institutions 
than one would expect given the size of the potential pool of high-ability low-income students (see for 
example Ehrenberg, 2006; Hill et al., 2005; Heller, 2004).   
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programs are focused on increasing matriculation of low-income students at their 
institutions and preliminary research from Harvard suggests that the program there has 
been somewhat successful in its goals. (Avery, Hoxby, Jackson, Burek, Poppe & 
Raman, 2006)   However, as of yet, there has been less of a focus on the determinants 
of educational outcomes of minority and low-income students enrolled at elite colleges 
and universities and how these outcomes can be improved.  Once they have 
matriculated, do students from these sub-groups do equally well in terms of their 
educational outcomes, such as grade point average (GPA), or persistence?  How do 
their own characteristics and those of the institution they attend affect their choices of 
college major?  Although there is a body of research examining measures of college 
success such as GPA and persistence, very little of this work has focused on how the 
importance of the determinants of these outcomes may differ for students from low-
income backgrounds or those from underrepresented minority groups.  This paper 
focuses on how the fit, both academic and social, between the student and the 
institution they attend impacts his/her educational outcomes, and how the importance 
of these measures of fit may differ for students from different income and racial 
backgrounds.  
Low-income and minority students face a number of hurdles at selective four-
year institutions both academically and socially.  Income and race have been found to 
be correlated with test scores - minority and low-income students on average tend to 
have lower test scores and be less well-prepared educationally when they enter 
college.  This may affect their success at elite colleges and universities, where median 
test scores are very high and the average student has been very well prepared for this 
level of study.  The importance of fit between a student and their institution in terms of 
test scores may differ for students from low-income and minority backgrounds.  These 
students may find themselves more or less capable than the average student of 
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overcoming this kind of hurdle, perhaps due to their background.  Socially, the 
environment at these institutions may be very unfamiliar for students from these 
groups.  The student bodies at these colleges and universities have very low 
percentages of low-income and minority students which may have social 
consequences for students from these groups that may in turn have educational 
spillovers.  If students feel out of place because there are not many other students from 
similar backgrounds with which to form friendships and study-groups, their 
coursework and other outcomes may suffer.  Or, it may be the case that these students 
could do better in an unfamiliar environment as this may cause them to reach outside 
of their comfort zone and form bonds with students of different backgrounds, which 
could in turn enhance their learning and educational outcomes.   
For these reasons, it is important to study how the interaction between 
students’ own characteristics and those of the institution they attend can affect their 
outcomes.  This paper will attempt to shed light on the post-secondary educational 
experiences of low-income and minority students, with a focus on students attending 
elite colleges and universities.  To do this I use two datasets, the National 
Longitudinal Survey of Freshmen (NLSF) and the National Education Longitudinal 
Study of 1988 (NELS:88) to examine the determinants of college GPA, persistence and 
college major choice.  This paper proceeds as follows.  Section II discusses the 
literature in this area and discusses in more detail the hypotheses this paper tests.  
Descriptive statistics are found in Section III, followed by Results in Sections IV, V, 
VI and VII and then concluding remarks.   
 
II. Background and Empirical Approach 
 Two ways to measure college success are grades earned during college and 
persistence to a Bachelor’s degree.  Research has shown that both measures are 
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closely linked with future success and earnings.  All else equal, students with higher 
GPAs upon graduation have been found to have higher future incomes.  Results of 
studies suggest that a full one point increase in college GPA is associated with roughly 
a 9% increase in earnings (Jones & Jackson, 1990).  In a separate paper, Wise finds a 
much smaller average effect of GPA on earnings, but his results suggest that the effect 
is almost twice as large for students graduating from more selective institutions 
(1975).  Graduate and professional programs also take college GPA into account when 
admitting students, and therefore GPA can have important consequences for further 
education.  Many studies have found that the wage premium associated with a four-
year degree is larger for those students receiving a degree from a more selective 
institution, as measured by median SAT scores (see for example Brewer, Eide & 
Ehrenberg, 1999).  A typical finding is that a one hundred point increase in median 
SAT scores of an institution is associated with a 3-7% increase in future earnings 
(Kane, 1998).  Although Dale and Krueger (2002) don’t find this connection for all 
students14, their results suggest that students from low-income families enjoy an 8% 
earnings increase for a 200 point increase in the median SAT scores of the institution 
they attend.  Additionally, a 2005 study by Thomas and Zhang shows that graduating 
from a more selective institution not only leads to higher salaries, but also to higher 
levels of wage growth after graduation.  These findings suggest that understanding 
what factors can impact both college GPA and persistence is important.  Past research 
has examined how student and institutional characteristics can impact GPA and 
persistence, but there has not been a focus on how interactions between these two 
groups of characteristics can impact educational outcomes.   
                                                 
14
 Dale and Krueger do find that students graduating from institutions with higher expenditures per 
student enjoy a wage premium (2002).  
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Studies have found that both test scores and high school GPA are significant 
predictors of college GPA and persistence.  Students with higher test scores and 
grades have demonstrated higher ability prior to entering college, and therefore tend to 
perform better in college and are more likely to persist to a four-year degree (Cohn, 
Cohn, Balch & Bradley, 2004; Titus, 2004).  In addition to showing scholastic ability, 
these measures also indicate that students that are better prepared during their time in 
high school to do college level work and earn higher grades in their college courses.  
In terms of institutional characteristics, research has shown that students attending 
more selective institutions are more likely to persist to a degree (Titus, 2004).   
There has been relatively little work examining how interactions between 
college characteristics and personal characteristics can impact the educational 
outcomes of students. It is possible to measure how good of a fit a student has with 
their chosen institution along two main dimensions, academic and social.  The 
research in this area has mostly focused on the first measure, with many studies 
examining how affirmative action affects the outcomes of students in minority groups.  
This body of research generally finds that minority students on average have test 
scores below that of the average at the institution they attend, but that this does not 
impact their probability of graduating15.  Minorities attending selective colleges and 
universities in fact seem to be more likely to graduate, suggesting that the hurdles they 
may face at these elite institutions do not ultimately harm persistence (see for example 
Bowen & Bok, 1998; Alon & Tienda, 2005; Cortes & McFarlin, Jr., 2008).  Fischer 
and Massey show that for Black and Hispanic students, having an SAT score below 
the institutional average actually leads to a slight increase in first-year GPA (2007).  
Light and Strayer use student test score quartiles and institutional quality measures to 
                                                 
15
 Loury and Garman, in their 1993 AER and 1995 JOLE papers, report an exception to this general 
pattern of findings.  Using the NLS72, the authors find that Black students earn lower GPAs and have 
lower future incomes if they are “mismatched” with their institution. 
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show that students are more likely to graduate if they are well-matched quality wise 
with the institution they attend (2000).  Bowen and Bok, using the College and 
Beyond database, show that graduation rates increase for both Black and White 
students of all SAT levels as the quality of the institution attended increases (1998).  
These studies provide evidence that academic institutional fit can play a role in 
determining educational outcomes, but it is still unclear how important this measure of 
fit is and how its effect may differ for students from different racial and income 
groups. 
The evidence on the importance of social integration is less developed.  
Research has shown that peers can affect academic performance.  Studies examining 
peer effects using the ability of randomly assigned roommates in college have found 
evidence that students have higher educational outcomes if they associate with higher 
ability students (Sacerdote, 2001; Zimmerman, 2003).   Results of these types of 
studies suggest that the formation of social networks by students in college can have 
importance consequences for their educational outcomes.  A body of research focusing 
on the formation of social networks by undergraduate students has found that both 
race and income can play an important role.  Mayer and Puller (2008) use friendship 
formation on the website Facebook.com for students at ten Texas Universities to 
examine the importance of race in social interactions.  They find that race is a 
significant determinant of a friendship formation, particularly for non-white students.  
Similarly, using the volume of emails between Dartmouth students as a measure of 
social interaction, Marmaros and Sacerdote (2006) find that within-race interactions 
are more likely to occur.  Additionally, the authors find that aided students are more 
likely to interact with other aided students than with a non-aided student, suggesting 
that family income, in addition to race, is important in social group formation by 
undergraduate students. 
 39
Therefore, it seems logical that the composition of the student body at the 
institution a student attends could affect the formation of his/her social network in 
college, and therefore their educational outcomes.  Fletcher and Tienda (2008), with a 
sample of students at one large University in Texas, show that students with more 
peers at college that attended the same high school do slightly better in their first-year 
GPA and are slightly more likely to persist past the first two years.  They also find 
evidence that for minority and disadvantaged students, increasing the number of 
students at the university from their high school from their own peer group (either 
defined by race or income) has a positive impact on both grades and persistence.  The 
results of a study examining grades and satisfaction with college for students at a 
liberal arts college found that students felt a stronger sense of belonging and 
performed better academically if a larger percentage of the student body came from 
their own social class (Ostrove & Long, 2007).     
The results of these studies provide suggestive evidence that the socio-
demographic composition of an institution could affect educational outcomes such as 
grades and persistence for low-income and minority students. Students who feel more 
comfortable in their college surroundings - possibly because there are more students 
with similar backgrounds with which to form friendships - may perform better 
academically as a result.  This may be because the effort they put into their work is 
more productive if they are socially comfortable or that students that are better able to 
form social networks are then better able to form study-groups and gain knowledge 
through their peers, therefore increasing their educational output.  It is also 
conceivable that minority or low-income students at institutions with very few other 
students from their respective peer groups may benefit from this by forming 
friendships outside of their normal social group, which could have an impact on their 
educational outcomes.  In particular, if this causes students to form social networks 
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and study groups composed of students with higher test scores than they would 
otherwise, this could positively impact educational outcomes.   
  In this paper I examine how measures of institutional fit, both academic and 
social, can affect educational outcomes of low-income and minority students.  To do 
this, I estimate first-year and cumulative college GPA, and the probability of 
graduating from one’s original institution within six years, transferring to a different 
institution, or dropping out of college altogether, as functions of a set of measures of 
institutional fit.  Academic fit is measured by the difference between a student’s own 
SAT score and the median SAT score of the four-year college or university that he or 
she attends.  This measure is interacted with an indicator for low-income status and it 
is not immediately obvious what sign one would expect this interaction to take; are 
low-income students more or less sensitive to an increase in the test score gap? These 
students come from a very different background, both family and education wise, and 
therefore they may deal with a mismatch in quality very differently than higher 
income students.  Low-income students may not be as well equipped to deal with the 
mismatch, as a result of fewer educational resources earlier in their lives.  It is also 
possible that the low-income students that have found their way into these selective 
institutions are experienced with educational adversity and are better equipped to deal 
with a mismatch than your average student.  Size of peer group, with peers defined by 
race or income status, is used to measure one element of social institutional fit.  These 
measures are used to test whether students’ academic outcomes are impacted on by the 
percentage of the student body at their institution that comes from their own peer 
group16.  All models are also estimated separately by racial group to examine how the 
effects of institutional fit may differ for students of different races. 
                                                 
16
 There is evidence that minority students take into account the size of a peer group defined along race 
lines when choosing what college to attend, and therefore, this measure is likely endogenous (Griffith & 
Rask, 2005).  It is unclear in which direction this bias may go.  Minority students taking into account 
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Students that attend a college or university at which their SAT scores do not 
match well, either due to large gaps above or below, have gone through two particular 
steps to get there.  First, the institution has chosen to accept the student knowing their 
test scores, and secondly, the student has chosen to enroll at the institution knowing 
how they will fit into the test score distribution of the student body.  The impact of an 
academic “mismatch” for these students is likely quite different from that of the 
exogenous impact for the average student due to this selection.  This suggests two 
policy questions.  What is the exogenous effect of a large gap in SAT scores and the 
median score of the institution?  What is the effect of a large gap in SAT scores for 
students that have been selected into this situation?  Both are interesting questions, but 
this paper will focus on the second to investigate whether an academic “mismatch” 
affects educational outcomes for the distribution of students that we see enrolled at 
selective colleges and universities.  I also will present results of an instrumental 
variables estimation of the exogenous impact of a “mismatch” in order to compare the 
effects.  The results of this comparison are used to draw conclusions about the 
preferences of students and colleges, as well as to comment on the success of both at 
sorting low test score students into the “correct” institutions to maximize their 
educational outcomes.   
In addition to understanding how the two measures of institutional fit affect 
grades and persistence, I examine their impact on a third type of outcome: student’s 
choice of major.  Earnings and occupational choice are linked to a student’s choice of 
major during college and there is a wide body of research examining college major 
                                                                                                                                            
the size of the minority student population at an institution when making matriculation decisions may 
do so for a couple of reasons.  They may be conscientious, hard-working students that pick the school 
with the best setting for them to succeed educationally, suggesting a positive bias.  Students may 
instead care about social opportunities and be less concerned with how the size of the minority 
population will affect their grades, suggesting a possible negative bias.  Ideally, one would instrument 
for peer group size, but unfortunately a valid instrument is not available in this data set. 
 42
choice.  Studies have found that socioeconomic status can affect choice of major, and 
that this effect can differ by gender (Leppel, Williams & Waldauer, 2001). In 
particular, they find that low-income students tend to be less likely to major in fields 
associated with risky income returns, such as Business (Saks & Shore, 2005).  
However, a 2005 study by Bowen and co-authors examining college major choice of 
students at 19 selective colleges and universities in the U.S. finds that the pattern of 
college major choice for low-income students is very similar to that of higher-income 
students. Other studies have also found that major choice can differ by race and in 
particular that black students are less likely to choose majors in Business or STEM 
fields like engineering and the physical sciences (Loury & Garman, 1995).  Here, I 
examine how the measures of institutional fit described above can impact on major 
choice, with a focus on the measures of social fit.  The socioeconomic and racial 
composition of the institution a student attends may influence the make-up of the 
social networks formed during college.  This may in turn affect course-taking 
behavior, and ultimately choice of college major. 
 
III. Data and Descriptive Statistics 
 In order to investigate these questions, I use two restricted-access longitudinal 
datasets, the National Longitudinal Survey of Freshman (NLSF) and the National 
Education Longitudinal Study of 1988 (NELS:88).  The NLSF consists of a sample of 
about 4000 students that first enrolled at 28 selective colleges and universities in the 
fall of 1999.  The sample and survey were modeled after the Andrew W. Mellon 
Foundation College and Beyond survey, with a few differences in the sample of 
institutions included.  Minority students are over-sampled in this dataset, resulting in 
relatively equal numbers of students from each of four groups: White, Black, Hispanic 
and Asian.  This sampling design allows for an in-depth analysis of how the effects of 
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the explanatory variables differ between racial groups.  Follow-up surveys were 
administered in the spring of each year for the first four years after matriculation.  In 
each wave, students are asked to report what college courses they took in each 
semester of that year, and what grades they received in each class.  This can then be 
used to calculate their GPAs for each semester, as well as their cumulative GPAs for 
all four years17.  The data also includes an indicator for whether students receive a 
degree within six years, and if students transferred from their original institution. 
The NELS:88 is a nationally representative dataset that surveyed 
approximately 24,000 students in eighth grade in 1988.  These students were 
administered follow-up surveys in the tenth and twelfth grades, as well as during their 
post-secondary experiences.  Roughly 4,500 students in this sample attended a four-
year college or university immediately following graduation from high school, and the 
study includes full college transcripts for these students.  This paper uses data on high 
school characteristics, test scores and family background information from the second 
follow-up, administered while the students were in their senior year of high school.  
Outcomes of college GPA and whether the student received a Bachelor’s degree 
and/or transferred from his/her original institution are reported in the transcript 
studies.   
 For both samples, data on institutional characteristics were compiled from 
three main sources.  Information on educational expenditures per student, control of 
the institution (Public or Private), and percentage of the student body from each racial 
group was obtained from the IPEDS database.  Median SAT scores for each institution 
in the samples were obtained from the College Board’s Annual Survey of Colleges 
                                                 
17
 A transcript study by Massey, et al. (2003) verified that self-reported grades were very similar to 
actual grades received and produce similar results when used in estimations.  
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data18.  The percentage of the student body that receives Pell Grants is used as a proxy 
for the percentage of students at each institution from low-income families.  All 
institutional characteristics were collected for the year in which students started their 
post-secondary study (for NELS:88 this is the 1992-1993 academic year, for the 
NLSF, this is the 1999-2000 academic year19). 
 Descriptive statistics for the student level variables from the NLSF and 
NELS:88 can be found in Tables 3.1 and 3.2 respectively, for the whole sample and 
broken down by income and race.  Here, low-income is defined as all students 
reporting family incomes of less than $35,000 in their senior year of high school20.  It 
is immediately noticeable that the NLSF successfully sampled all four main racial 
groups fairly equally.  This is helpful in this study, allowing larger sample sizes for 
minority groups, as well as a larger sample of low-income students.  Although average 
high school GPA is similar across the two income groups in both samples, SAT scores 
are markedly different.  Students from low-income backgrounds on average have SAT 
scores about 90 points lower than their higher income counterparts.  As a result, 70% 
of low-income students in the NLSF sample attended an institution at which their 
personal SAT score is below the median SAT score of the school, while only 50% of 
higher income students did so.  Of the students that have SAT scores below the 
median of their institution, low-income students have average scores that are much 
lower than the median, on average about 50 points lower than higher income students.   
                                                 
18
 What is referred to as a median SAT score in this paper is actually the midpoint of the inter-quartile 
percentile range.  Assuming SAT scores within this range at an institution are not clumped at one end or 
another, this measure is a good approximation of the median. 
19
 Institution-level data is not available from IPEDS for the 1999-2000 year so these variables are taken 
as the average of the values reported in 1998 and 2000. 
20
 Family income is only reported in ranges in both data sets and therefore a continuous measure of 
family income is not available.   Although $35,000 is not an equivalent family income in both time 
periods due to inflation, this paper uses the same income cut-off as the next lowest cut-off in NELS:88 
is much lower than $35,000 in 1999 dollars.  Estimations using this lower cut-off ($25,000 in 1991 
dollars) yield qualitatively similar results, but lose some precision due to small sample sizes.  Results 
are also not sensitive to using a higher income cut-off in either data set. 
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Table 3.1: Descriptive Statistics for Student Variables (NLSF) 
  
          
  
Whole 
Sample 
Income 
>35K 
Income 
<35K Black Hisp. Asian White 
Female 0.581 0.574 0.617 0.650 0.581 0.565 0.524 
Black 0.268 0.240 0.403     
Asian 0.244 0.255 0.190     
Hispanic 0.233 0.217 0.314     
HS GPA 3.701 3.714 3.639 3.554 3.700 3.786 3.775 
 
(0.331) (0.322) (0.368) (0.375) (0.325) (0.281) (0.274) 
HS private 0.289 0.301 0.229 0.296 0.335 0.245 0.282 
SAT 1304 1318 1228 1194 1278 1374 1359 
 
(161) (156) (167) (167) (140) (135) (133) 
SAT<MedianSAT 0.532 0.498 0.708 0.812 0.678 0.310 0.360 
Difference in 
SATs if below 127 117 164 167 124 80 87 
    Median (110) (107) (113) (127) (95) (77) (86) 
Parent: BA 0.240 0.235 0.264 0.264 0.248 0.243 0.204 
Parent: Grad 
degree 0.537 0.607 0.193 0.413 0.442 0.595 0.700 
Income < $35,000 0.176   0.266 0.238 0.137 0.065 
Income < $50,000 0.297   0.383 0.439 0.577 0.068 
GPA First-Year 3.177 3.208 3.025 2.980 3.094 3.308 3.336 
 
(0.509) (0.490) (0.567) (0.517) (0.528) (0.454) (0.440) 
Cumulative GPA 3.248 3.276 3.113 3.047 3.193 3.372 3.393 
 
(0.438) (0.422) (0.485) (0.439) (0.443) (0.383) (0.385) 
Grad Orig. Inst.  6 
yrs 0.828 0.843 0.768 0.757 0.822 0.871 0.869 
Transfer 0.111 0.106 0.124 0.141 0.127 0.078 0.096 
Dropout 0.061 0.050 0.109 0.102 0.051 0.051 0.035 
Major Humanities 0.067 0.069 0.059 0.053 0.075 0.057 0.083 
Major Soc. Sci. 0.145 0.140 0.166 0.173 0.165 0.109 0.130 
Major Bus./Econ. 0.091 0.094 0.080 0.070 0.072 0.120 0.103 
Major STEM 0.180 0.181 0.176 0.137 0.159 0.224 0.203 
N 3924 3261 663 1051 916 959 998 
 
There are also significant differences in test scores across racial groups.  Black and 
Hispanic students have significantly lower SAT scores on average and are more than 
twice as likely than Asian or White students to attend an institution at which their 
personal scores are below the median.   For students with SAT scores below the 
median, the gaps are much larger for Black and Hispanic students, than for White and  
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Table 3.2 : Descriptive Statistics for NELS:88 
 
   
  Whole Sample Income>35K Income<35K 
Female 0.553 0.525 0.606 
Black 0.079 0.056 0.146 
Asian 0.103 0.101 0.108 
Hispanic 0.077 0.061 0.127 
HS GPA 3.155 3.172 3.109 
 
(0.565) (0.562) (0.571) 
HS Private 0.229 0.265 0.125 
Pct. Free Lunch G12 15.535 13.128 22.556 
 
(18.785) (16.983) (21.796) 
SAT  1078 1100 1013 
 
(179) (175) (174) 
SAT < Median 0.49 0.40 0.41 
Difference in SATs 130 124 149 
  if below Median (89) (86) (94) 
Par: Some College 0.338 0.287 0.476 
Par: BA 0.237 0.264 0.162 
Par: MA 0.170 0.212 0.056 
Par: PhD/Prof. Deg. 0.114 0.150 0.016 
Income < $35,000 0.262   
GPA First-Year 2.693 2.734 2.574 
 
(0.744) (0.720) (0.799) 
Cumulative GPA 2.822 2.871 2.679 
 
(0.683) (0.647) (0.760) 
Grad Orig. Inst. 6 yrs 0.565 0.601 0.500 
Transfer 0.212 0.222 0.172 
Dropout 0.224 0.178 0.329 
N 4140 3090 1060 
 
Asian students.   These numbers suggest that if there is a link between entering college 
with SAT scores well below the median at an institution and educational outcomes,  
then low-income and minority students are more likely to be impacted than other 
students.   
 Tables 3.1 and 3.2 also suggest that low-income and minority students are at a 
disadvantage in terms of outcomes during college.  Low-income students have first 
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year GPAs that are 0.2 points lower on average than higher income students.  This gap 
narrows slightly by senior year in the NLSF sample, but remains significant, and does 
not narrow at all for the NELS:88 sample. Black and Hispanic students also have 
lower GPAs then White and Asian students in both the first year and cumulatively, 
and these gaps do not narrow. We see a similar pattern with persistence in the NLSF 
sample.  Low-income and minority students are less likely to have graduated from 
their original institution within 6 years, and are more likely to have transferred from 
their original institution or dropped out of college altogether21.  In the NELS:88 
sample, it is the case that low-income students are less likely to have graduated from 
their original four-year institution within six years, and more likely to have dropped 
out of college altogether.  However, in this sample, low-income students are actually 
less likely to have transferred to another college than their higher income peers. 
 Descriptive statistics for choice of college major by senior year for the students 
in the NLSF sample are also shown in Table 3.1.  Students are about twice as likely to 
major in a STEM field or a Social Science, than Humanities or Economics/Business.  
Some of these differences in means may be due to the programs available to major in 
at each of the institutions included in this sample.  There are not any immediately 
obvious differences in major choice for the two income groups, although low-income 
students are slightly less likely to have majors in the Humanities or 
Business/Economics, there is not a significant difference in means.  This may be due 
to the typically low returns to Humanities majors, and high variability in returns to 
Business/Economics majors, a behavior that has been documented in the literature.  
There are some significant differences in major choice across races.  Black and 
                                                 
21
 Here dropping out is defined as having not transferred away from or received a Bachelor’s degree  
from one’s original institution within 6 years of matriculation.  Transfer students have transferred from 
their original institution to another four-year college or university, but these students may or may not 
have received a degree within 6 years of matriculation. 
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Hispanic students seem to be concentrated in Social Science and STEM majors, as 
well as in majors not included in any of these main categories, whereas White and 
Asian students seem to be concentrated in Social science, Business/Economics, and 
STEM majors.  This grouping of Black and Hispanic students in STEM majors seems 
contradictory to the findings of some past research, but is very similar to the findings 
of Bowen et al. (2005).  As that study focused on fairly selective colleges and 
universities and also found very little difference across races in college major choice, 
it seems likely that the difference is a result of the highly selective nature of both the 
students and institutions in the NLSF. 
 Table 3.3 contains descriptive statistics for the samples of four year institutions 
attended by students in each of the two data sets. Panel A shows the sample of 28 four 
year schools in the NLSF, 82% of which are private.  This is a sample of highly 
selective institutions with educational expenditures per student at $44,000 on 
average22, and an average median SAT score of 1326.  Showing the under-
representation of low-income students at elite colleges and universities, the percent of 
students receiving Pell Grants is 15%.  However, there is much variation between 
institutions in the NLSF sample as this percentage ranges from 8% to 44%.  These 
colleges and universities also have low percentages of students from minority groups 
with these percentages ranging from less than 1% to over 87%23.   
A set of similar statistics for the sample of schools attended by students in the 
NELS:88 data are displayed in Panel B.  These institutions are far less selective, and  
 
                                                 
22
 A number of institutions attended by students in the NLSF sample have exceptionally high 
educational expenditures per student, leading to a fairly high average.  However, the median of 
educational expenditures per student is still quite high, at almost $32,000 per student. 
23
 One institution surveyed in the NLSF is a Historically Black College or University (HBCU), which is 
generating the very high maximum for percent minority.  If one looks at the sample of institutions not 
considered to be HBCUs, the maximum on percent minority is 40%  
 49
Table 3.3: Descriptive Statistics for Institutions attended by students in the 
NLSF & NELS:88 Samples 
 
  
Panel A: NLSF Institutions 
 Mean Std. Dev. 
Private 0.82 0.39 
Educ. Exp/student 43.58 32.94 
Median SAT 1326 92 
Inst.GPA1 3.19 0.13 
Inst. GPA 3.27 0.12 
Pct. Pell 15.20 8.26 
Pct. Black 9.23 15.36 
Pct. Hispanic 4.84 2.60 
Pct. Asian 11.55 8.01 
N 28   
   
Panel B: NELS:88 Institutions 
 Mean Std. Dev. 
Private 0.54 0.50 
Educ. Exp/Student 8.95 8.92 
Median SAT 1098 110 
Pct. Pell 28.81 14.70 
Pct. Black 10.12 19.32 
Pct. Hispanic 3.98 8.07 
Pct. Asian 3.52 5.76 
N 1040   
 
less likely to be private.  The average educational expenditures per student is only 
$9,00024 and the average re-centered median SAT score is 1098, about 200 points 
lower than for the institutions in the NLSF sample.  These institutions also have a 
much larger average percentage of Pell Grant recipients, 29%.  Due to these 
differences between samples, results of estimations using this sample of schools may 
be very different, but perhaps more representative of four-year colleges and 
universities in general and specifically of the population of less selective four-year 
institutions, than those resulting from the NLSF estimations.  Therefore, the use of 
                                                 
24
 All dollar amounts were adjusted for inflation to $1999, using the inflation calculator at 
www.bls.gov/data/inflation_calculator.htm 
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both datasets allows us to directly compare how results differ for students at very 
selective colleges and universities, as in the NLSF, and for those at four-year 
institutions across a broader range of selectivity as seen in NELS:88.       
 
IV. Results: Determinants of GPA 
 Cumulative and first-year GPA were estimated using the Tobit function shown 
below in equation (1) in order to take into account a small amount of clustering 
(roughly 10% of the sample) at a GPA of 4.0.  Results are quantitatively very similar 
to those using OLS, but there is a slight gain in efficiency.  Assuming that there is a 
continuous underlying variable ° that correctly measures grade point average but 
that we only observe the variable GPA such that: 
 = °   ° < 4 
 = 4  . . 
One can then maximize the following likelihood function in (1) to obtain consistent 
and unbiased estimates of β. 
1           ℒ,  = 1 − Φ ′ 
 ∙ !1 " #1  − ′ $%

 
Where d is an indicator equal to 1 if ° < 4, and equal to 0 otherwise. 
Results for Tobit estimations of college GPA in the first year and cumulative 
for the first four years, using the NLSF dataset are shown in Tables 3.4 and 3.5 
respectively.  All four columns include controls for personal characteristics, such as 
gender, race, parent’s education level, high school GPA, composite SAT score, 
whether they attended a public or private high school, and main course of study in 
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college, as well as institution characteristics, such as expenditure per student, control 
(public or private) and the mean and variance of GPA at the institution level25.   
Table 3.4:Determinants of First-year GPA (NLSF) 
      
 
Whole 
Sample Black Hispanic Asian White 
Black -0.153     
 (0.020)*** 
    
Hispanic -0.13     
 (0.016)*** 
    
Asian -0.004     
 (0.017) 
    
High School GPA 0.439 0.419 0.381 0.513 0.495 
 (0.026)*** (0.050)*** (0.077)*** (0.054)*** (0.054)*** 
Private High School 0.037 0.099 0.018 -0.016 0.059 
 (0.021)* (0.030)*** (0.037) (0.038) (0.034)* 
Income< $35,000 0.022 0.062 -0.106 0.182 -0.059 
 (0.054) (0.089) (0.077) (0.087)** (0.201) 
Income > $75,000 0.041 0.07 0.073 -0.024 0.047 
 (0.021)* (0.027)*** (0.036)** (0.037) (0.031) 
Dist. Sat Below 
Median -0.083 -0.058 -0.088 -0.061 -0.068 
 (0.025)*** (0.030)* (0.050)* (0.046) (0.037)* 
Low Inc. x Dist. Below 
Median -0.027 -0.046 0.031 -0.098 0.083 
 (0.021) (0.028)* (0.026) (0.058)* (0.035)** 
Dist. SAT above 
Median 0.154 0.204 0.156 0.149 0.107 
 (0.024)*** (0.050)*** (0.049)*** (0.021)*** (0.034)*** 
Low Inc. X Dist. 
Above Median -0.091 -0.108 0.09 -0.254 0.049 
 (0.065) (0.060)* (0.069) (0.114)** (0.105) 
Pct Pell Grant 0.002 0.006 0.001 0.002 -0.001 
 (0.001)* (0.002)** (0.002) (0.001)* (0.002) 
Low Inc. x PctPell 0.001 0.002 0.001 -0.003 0.006 
 (0.001) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.008) 
Pct Own Race  0.002 0 -0.003 0 
  (0.001)* (0.006) (0.001)*** (0.001) 
Observations 3748 1009 875 915 949 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; **significant at 5%;  *** 
significant at 1%. Includes controls for gender, SAT scores, parent's education, exp/student, 
mean and variance of institutional GPA,  institution type and student's major course of study.   
                                                 
25
 Average institutional GPA and its variance were calculated using students in the NLSF sample.  
Assuming this was a relatively random sample, this measure should capture the institutional averages 
fairly well.  
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Table 3.5:Determinants of Cumulative GPA (NLSF) 
      
 
Whole 
Sample Black Hispanic Asian White 
Black -0.168     
 (0.022)*** 
    
Hispanic -0.114     
 (0.013)*** 
    
Asian -0.021     
 (0.017) 
    
High School GPA 0.392 0.368 0.344 0.455 0.467 
 (0.020)*** (0.028)*** (0.065)*** (0.050)*** (0.038)*** 
Private High 
School 0.051 0.089 0.027 0.022 0.078 
 (0.017)*** (0.021)*** (0.029) (0.024) (0.027)*** 
Income< $35,000 0.018 0.045 -0.057 0.109 0.057 
 (0.033) (0.056) (0.081) (0.067) (0.185) 
Income > $75,000 0.03 0.055 0.046 -0.019 0.036 
 (0.018)* (0.029)* (0.03) (0.036) (0.025) 
Dist. Sat Below 
Median -0.057 -0.025 -0.055 -0.061 -0.058 
 (0.020)*** (0.026) (0.047) (0.032)* (0.033)* 
Low Inc. x Dist. 
Below Median -0.026 -0.041 0.045 -0.109 0.001 
 (0.013)* (0.018)** (0.028) (0.046)** (0.056) 
Dist. SAT above 
Median 0.1 0.184 0.086 0.107 0.064 
 (0.015)*** (0.043)*** (0.050)* (0.021)*** (0.023)*** 
Low Inc. X Dist. 
Above Median -0.017 -0.136 0.121 -0.107 -0.022 
 (0.029) (0.079)* (0.068)* (0.048)** (0.101) 
Pct Pell Grant 0.002 0.008 0.001 0.002 -0.002 
 (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001) (0.001)** (0.001)*** 
Low Inc. x PctPell 0 0 -0.002 0 0.001 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.008) 
Pct Own Race  0.001 -0.004 -0.002 0 
  (0) (0.007) (0.001)*** (0.001) 
Observations 3748 1009 875 915 949 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; **significant at 5%;  *** 
significant at 1%. Includes controls for gender, SAT scores, parent's education, exp/student, 
mean and variance of institutional GPA,  institution type and student's major course of 
study.   
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Looking at Tables 3.4 and 3.5, Column (1) in both tables shows the results for 
the estimation of GPA for the entire sample26.  High-income students have slightly 
higher GPAs than middle-income students in both the first-year and cumulatively. 
Although low-income students have lower average GPAs, low-income status does not 
have a direct effect on GPA after controlling for personal and institutional 
characteristics and measures of institutional fit.  However, even after controlling for 
personal and institutional characteristics and measures of institutional fit, Black and 
Hispanic students still earn lower GPAs in both the first year and cumulatively.  As 
seen in past research, educational background is particularly important in determining 
college GPA.  Students that performed better in high school, as measured by high 
school GPA, also earned higher grades in college and students that attended private 
high schools have higher GPAs in college.  These findings provide support for the 
common practice of using these measures heavily in admissions decisions.   
The degree of fit between a student and the institution they attend in terms of 
academic measures can also impact college GPA.  Academic fit is measured by the 
gap between personal SAT scores and institution median SAT scores and this effect is 
allowed to differ for students with scores below and above the median to test for 
asymmetries.  For students with SAT scores below the institutional median, the larger 
the gap in the scores, the lower the average GPA.  This effect occurs both in the first 
year and overall, although the size of the effect decreases slightly by the fourth year. A 
higher-income student with a personal SAT score 100 points below the institutional 
median would on average have a cumulative GPA that was 0.06 points lower.  This 
effect is stronger for low-income students, by about 0.03 GPA points, although the 
                                                 
26
 All estimation results reported for the whole sample are not weighted to take into account the specific 
sampling design to obtain relatively equal numbers of students from each racial group.  However, when 
the data is weighted to be representative of the racial distribution we see at the institutions in the NLSF 
sample the results are very similar, and therefore results are not sensitive to this type of weighting. 
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coefficient is not significant for first-year GPA.  Low-income students that enter 
college with SAT scores 100 points below the institutional median will on average 
have GPAs that are lower by 0.09 points than if they had attended an institution with 
median scores equal to their own27.  Remember, 70% of all low-income students have 
SAT scores below the median, and the average gap is well over 100 points.  Therefore, 
this is a significant group of students that is affected.  Given results of past studies 
relating changes in GPA to earnings, this effect is small in terms of future earnings, 
but still significant.  A 0.09 point decrease in GPA would be associated with less than 
a 1% decrease in lifetime earnings. 
Students entering universities with SAT scores above the median receive 
higher GPAs, and the effect of the gap in scores is almost twice as large as for those 
with scores below the median.  It is not altogether surprising that the impact of a gap 
in test scores is not symmetric for those below the median and those above.  It may be 
that this positive gap in scores is measuring additional academic ability which is 
leading to higher grades received in college.  It is also possible that students entering 
with scores below the median are positively influenced by their higher-scoring peers, 
and therefore the “cost” of entering with scores below the median is slightly mediated.   
  The grades of low-income students do not seem to be impacted by the size of 
their peer group as defined by income, a measure of social fit.  It may be that this 
measure of peer group size is not precise enough, in that it doesn’t directly measure 
the size of the peer group an incoming student may come in contact with most often, 
the number of low-income students in their own class. In some of the larger 
                                                 
27
 One might think that the effect of a large test score gap, either below or above, may differ by the 
range of SAT scores at the institution.  Students at institutions with a fairly wide distribution of test 
scores may find a large test score gap to be less of a hindrance.  Estimations including an indicator 
variable for schools with a large test score range (an inter-quartile range of greater than 200 points) 
show no evidence of this and if anything, suggest that students with large test score gaps below the 
median that attend schools with large test score ranges earn lower GPAs than those attending 
institutions with a “tighter” test score distribution. 
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universities, students may only come in contact with peers within their own school, 
field, or dorm, and the peer group size there may not be proportionate to that in the 
entire student body.  Therefore, although there is not a significant result found here, it 
is possible that the available measure is just not fine enough to capture it. 
Results of similar estimations of GPA for the NELS:88 data are reported in 
Table 3.6.  Results from this sample, all four-year colleges or universities attended by 
students in the NELS:88 data, can be used to examine whether the results found using 
the NLSF are specific to students attending selective colleges or universities, or if 
these effects are universal to students attending four-year institutions. As with the 
NLSF results, there is no direct effect of income on college GPA in the NELS:88 
sample. The farther below the median of the institution a student’s personal SAT score 
falls, the lower their GPA in both their first year and cumulatively. A student with a 
SAT score 100 points below the median has a first year GPA that is 0.08 points lower.  
This gap shrinks slightly, to 0.06 GPA points, by their final year, but remains 
significant.  Opposite to what was found with the NLSF data, low-income students 
with SAT scores below the median have higher GPAs in both their first and final years 
as this gap increases.  On average, low-income students with SAT scores 100 points 
below the median will have first-year GPAs that are only 0.03 points lower, and the 
effect on cumulative GPA is almost negligible.  The difference in results between the 
two samples is likely due to both differences in selectivity of the students and the 
institutions they attend.  Low-income students at more selective institutions, as seen in 
the NLSF, receive lower grades than high-income students due to a large gap in SAT 
scores, whereas at the far less selective sample of institutions contained in the 
NELS:88 sample, low-income students with large test score gaps are able to perform 
better.  Low-income students at selective institutions may have been less well prepared 
to adapt to the high level of work required to succeed in their courses.  This same type  
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Table 3.6: Results for estimation of GPA and Persistence using NELS:88 
 
    
Multinomial Logit 
Coefficients 
 GPA1  GPA  Dropout  Transfer 
Black -0.039  -0.196  -0.041  -0.479 
 (0.041) 
 
(0.035)*** 
 
(0.162) 
 
(0.194)** 
  
 
 
 
[1.36] 
 
[-6.56] 
Hispanic -0.154  -0.116  0.437  0.142 
 (0.047)*** 
 
(0.034)*** 
 
(0.168)*** 
 
(0.192) 
  
 
 
 
[5.83] 
 
[0.08] 
Asian 0.017  -0.088  -0.301  -0.075 
 (0.038) 
 
(0.027)*** 
 
(0.182)* 
 
(0.156) 
  
 
 
 
[-3.71] 
 
[0.11] 
High School GPA 0.527  0.337  -1.25  -0.61 
 (0.040)***  (0.023)***  (0.146)***  (0.110)*** 
     [-14.73]  [-3.95] 
Private High School -0.028  -0.036  -0.279  -0.081 
 (0.03)  (0.021)*  (0.137)**  (0.124) 
     [-3.44]  [-0.06] 
Income<$35,000 -0.072  0.034  0.553  -0.752 
 
(0.064)  (0.048)  (0.260)**  (0.278)*** 
 
    [11.48]  [-12.83] 
Dist. Sat Below Median -0.083  -0.062  0.057  -0.185 
 
(0.020)***  (0.015)***  (0.086)  (0.089)** 
 
    [1.64]  [-3.18] 
Low Inc. x Dist. Below 
Median 0.047  0.062  -0.077  0.261 
 
(0.028)*  (0.021)***  (0.107)  (0.117)** 
 
    [-2.25]  [4.46] 
Dist. SAT above 
Median 0.084  0.069  0.389  0.099 
 
(0.026)***  (0.017)***  (0.119)***  (0.104) 
 
    [5.00]  [-0.20] 
Low Inc. x Dist. Above 
Median 0.05  -0.013  -0.375  0.039 
 
(0.044)  (0.034)  (0.189)**  (0.181) 
 
    [-5.43]  [2.32] 
Pct. Pell Grant 0.002  0.002  0.018  0 
 
(0.001)  (0.001)*  (0.005)***  (0.005) 
 
    [0.26]  [-0.08] 
Low Inc. X Pct. Pell 0.001  -0.001  -0.008  0.014 
 
(0.002)  (0.001)  (0.007)  (0.009) 
 
    [-0.17]  [0.25] 
Observations 3970   2410   910   860 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 
significant at 1%.  Average marginal effects for multinomial logit estimations included in 
brackets. All columns include controls for gender, race, high school type and GPA, SAT, % 
free lunch, parent's education, institution type, exp/student and Pct. residential.  
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of students attending less selective institutions may be able to substitute less difficult 
courses in order to keep their grades up, something that is likely not an option at more 
elite institutions as the level of work is very high in all courses.  When an interaction 
between the gap in scores and an indicator for institutions with re-centered SAT scores 
greater than or equal to 1250 is included, results suggest that the impact of a gap in 
scores is greater at more selective schools. The results for the effect of a gap in SAT 
scores may be heightened at more selective schools, but these results may also have 
some implications for students at four-year institutions in general. Again, although the 
effect on GPA is significant, in terms of policy significance, the effects are small.  
Similar to the findings with the NLSF sample, the percentage of students at an 
institution receiving Pell Grants does not have a significant impact on the GPAs of 
low-income students. 
 In order to examine if and how these findings may differ by race, Tables 3.4 
and 2.5 also show estimates of first-year and cumulative GPA for each of the four 
main racial groups separately, using the NLSF sample.  There are some differences 
between the races that are immediately apparent.  Low-income Asian students have 
higher first-year GPAs than their higher-income counterparts.  This effect is no longer 
significant for cumulative GPA, but remains positive.  Low-income Asian students are 
far more likely to be immigrants to the U.S. than their higher income counterparts; 
46% of low-income Asian students are foreign-born whereas only 28% of higher 
income Asian students are.  As immigrants or children of immigrants, these students 
may benefit from an additional drive to succeed in college in the United States.  It is 
also possible that foreign-born low-income students have higher levels of academic 
preparation in their home countries, which allows them to perform better in their first 
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year of college28.  As with the pooled sample, there is no direct effect of low-income 
status on GPA for students of the other three race categories.  High school GPA is an 
important predictor of college GPA for all four groups, but having attended a private 
high school does not impact GPA for Asian and Hispanic students.    
Academic fit plays a role in determining GPA for students of all races, but the 
effects differ by group.  Students from all four groups have lower first-year GPAs the 
farther their SAT score is below the institutional median and the size of the effects 
decrease slightly by the fourth year and in some cases are no longer significant.  
Although negative for all groups, the coefficients are significant for all but Asian 
students in the first-year, and then only significant for White and Asian students in the 
cumulative GPA equations.  The impact on first-year GPA of academic fit is largest 
for Hispanic students: a 100 point gap between their score and the median of their 
institution is associated with a 0.09 points lower GPA (0.06 for cumulative GPA).  
The results are similar for White and Black students but slightly smaller.  Low-income 
Black and Asian students with large test score gaps below the median have even lower 
GPAs than a higher-income student in this position and for both groups this effect 
persists through the fourth year.  A low-income Asian student with a SAT score 100 
points below the institutional median would have a GPA 0.17 points lower on average 
in the fourth year.  
Students from all four groups with personal scores above that of the median of 
the institution they attend earn higher GPAs both in the first-year and cumulatively as 
the gap between scores increases.  The effect of a gap is much larger for students 
                                                 
28
 Estimations of GPA for the Asian sub-sample controlling for whether the student was born in the 
U.S. continue to show that low-income Asian students earn higher first-year GPAs than higher-income 
Asian students.  It may be that low-income Asian students that are foreign-born and receive a 
substantial amount of their pre-college education outside of the U.S. are better prepared for college-
level work.  Unfortunately, I am unable to control for how long the student has been in the U.S. to test 
this theory. 
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scoring above the median than for those scoring below.  For Black and Asian low-
income students, this effect is slightly dampened, and the total effect is actually 
negative in the first-year and zero by the fourth year for low-income Asian students 
scoring above the median.  Low-income Hispanic students scoring above the median 
experience a bump in cumulative GPA.  Academic fit is therefore an important 
determinant of GPA, but this measure has varying effects depending on the race of the 
student and whether their scores fall above or below the median.  Grades of low-
income Black and Asian students are more sensitive to a large gap in test scores, 
particularly for students scoring below the median.  Hispanic students with scores 
below the median do not earn significantly lower cumulative GPAs as this gap 
increases, but Hispanic students above the median do extremely well in terms of first-
year and cumulative GPA, particularly so those from low-income backgrounds.   
 In order to examine the effects of social fit, both the percentage of low-income 
students in the student body and the percent own race in the student body are included 
in these estimations, to examine how the size of peer groups as defined along both 
income and race lines can affect grades earned in college.  Percent own race 
significantly impacts GPA for Black and Asian students.  If the percent of the student 
body that is Asian is 10% higher, Asian students would have on average 0.03 points 
lower first-year GPA and 0.02 points lower cumulative GPAs, which are small effects.  
For Black students, a higher proportion of the student body that is Black is associated 
wither higher first-year GPA by 0.02 points (for a 10% increase).  For the other two 
groups, there is no effect of the percentage of one’s own race in the student body.  As 
we saw in the pooled sample, there is no effect of the size of the low-income peer 
group at their institution for low-income students of any race.  
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V. Results: Persistence 
The multinomial logit function shown below in (2) was used to estimate the 
probability of graduating within 6 years from one’s original institution, transferring 
from the original institution attended in freshman year, or dropping out of college. 
 
2        ' = ( = )*+,-1 + )*+,-   / ( = 0,1,2 
Results of multinomial logit estimations of persistence for the NLSF sample are 
reported in Table 3.7, as well as separately for each of the main race groups in Table 
3.8.  Coefficients reported are relative to the base category of remaining at one’s 
original institution and receiving a degree within six years.  Average marginal effects 
are reported in brackets.  As with GPA, there is no direct effect of income for the 
whole sample.  Low-income students in the Hispanic sub-sample are more likely to 
dropout than higher-income students, relative to staying and graduating.  High school 
GPA plays an important role in predicting persistence. Students with higher high 
school grades are less likely to transfer from their original institution or to dropout.  
Having attended a private high school does not have a significant impact on any of 
these outcomes.   
As the gap between a student’s SAT score and that of the median score of the 
institution he or she attends widens, students with scores below the median are slightly 
less likely to transfer, but academic fit does not impact on the probability of dropping 
out versus staying and receiving a degree within six years.  Students that first 
matriculate at a selective college with a large gap between their scores and the median 
may have fewer “better” outside options to which they could transfer, which may be 
generating this result.  After breaking down the estimations by race, one can see that 
the effect of academic fit on these measures of persistence varies by race.  White 
students with scores below the median are more likely to stay and graduate within six  
 61
 
Table 3.7: Multinomial Logit Estimates of Probability of Transferring or 
Dropping Out (NLSF) 
 Dropout  Transfer 
Black 0.98  0.292 
 (0.173)*** 
 
(0.126)** 
 [5.91] 
 
[1.96] 
Hispanic 0.275  0.244 
 (0.26) 
 
(0.116)** 
 [1.35] 
 
[2.17] 
Asian 0.295  -0.209 
 (0.282) 
 
(0.158) 
 [1.90] 
 
[-2.15] 
High School GPA -0.697  -0.687 
 (0.166)***  (0.156)*** 
 [-0.50]  [-1.09] 
Private High School -0.093  0 
 (0.188)  (0.11) 
 [-3.20]  [-2.15] 
Income < $35,000 0.058  -0.113 
 
(0.501)  (0.275) 
 
[0.41]  [-1.09] 
Dist. Sat Below Median -0.055  -0.412 
 (0.157)  (0.101)*** 
 [0.04]  [-3.88] 
Low Inc. x Dist. Below Median 0.243  0.016 
 (0.157)  (0.123) 
 [1.30]  [-0.05] 
Dist. SAT above Median 0.126  0.279 
 (0.182)  (0.172) 
 [0.45]  [2.56] 
Low Inc. X Dist. Above Median 0.195  0.145 
 (0.364)  (0.241) 
 [0.93]  [1.23] 
Pct. Pell Grant 0.009  -0.009 
 
(0.015)  (0.01) 
 
[0.05]  [-0.09] 
Low Inc. X Pct. Pell 0.009  0.004 
 
(0.025)  (0.015) 
 
[0.05]  [0.03] 
Constant 0.018  5.99 
 
(1.721)   (1.427)*** 
Observations 240   440 
Notes: All coefficients are relative to base category of graduating from original  
institution within 6 years. Robust standard errors in parentheses.* significant at 10%; 
**significant at 5%;  ***significant at 1%. Average marginal effects in brackets. Includes 
controls for gender, SAT scores, parent's education, educ. exp/student, and institution type. 
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Table 3.8: Multinomial Logit Estimates of Probability of Transferring or Dropping Out by Race(NLSF) 
             
           
 Black  Hispanic  Asian  White 
 Dropout Transfer  Dropout Transfer  Dropout Transfer  Dropout Transfer 
High School GPA -0.762 -0.891  -0.868 -0.125  -1.164 -0.432  -1.455 -1.263 
 (0.274)*** (0.222)***  (0.463)* (0.391)  (0.440)*** (0.578)  (0.698)** (0.439)*** 
 [5.07] [-8.89]  [-3.58] [-0.76]  [-5.23] [-2.42]  [-4.07] [-9.99] 
Private High School -0.033 0.168  -0.05 -0.153  0.108 0.22  -0.546 -0.273 
 (0.248) (0.254)  (0.352) (0.22)  (0.355) (0.344)  (0.493) (0.264) 
 [0.58] [2.03]  [-0.11] [-1.57]  [0.41] [1.51]  [-1.45] [-2.01] 
Income < $35,000 -0.4 -0.305  1.512 0.653  -0.012 -0.974  -1.796 0.66 
 
(0.633) (0.321)  (0.603)** (0.66)  (0.744) (0.747)  (2.443) (0.918) 
 
[2.81] [-2.71]  [7.17] [6.30]  [0.32] [-5.20]  [-3.61] [7.33] 
Dist. Sat Below Median -0.319 -0.44  0.403 -0.446  0.532 -0.456  -1.532 -0.685 
 (0.184)* (0.258)*  (0.555) (0.237)*  (0.572) (0.309)  (0.706)** (0.310)** 
 [2.01] [-4.49]  [2.00] [-5.02]  [2.69] [-3.36]  [-4.52] [-5.14] 
Low Inc. x Dist. Below 
Median 0.32 0.2  0.123 -0.065       
 (0.202) (0.166)  (0.283) (0.3)       
 [-2.43] [1.74]  [0.56] [-5.02]       
Dist. SAT above Median -0.228 -0.762  -0.853 -0.155  0.322 0.602  1.555 0.725 
 (0.285) (0.525)  (0.502)* (0.317)  (0.461) (0.352)*  (0.393)*** (0.318)** 
 [0.65] [-8.34]  [-3.50] [-1.09]  [1.23] [3.97]  [4.58] [5.47] 
Low Inc. X Dist. Above 
Median -0.478 -3.819  -0.695 0.172  0.176 0.235  1.677 -0.15 
 (0.632) (2.057)*  (1.452) (0.632)  (0.553) (0.519)  (0.948)* (1.078) 
 [-2.51] [-42.95]  [-3.05] [2.29]  [0.71] [1.53]  [5.28] [-1.87] 
Pct. Pell Grant 0.006 0.006  0.02 -0.009  -0.006 -0.021  0.004 -0.008 
 
(0.021) (0.013)  (0.022) (0.014)  (0.026) (0.014)  (0.01) (0.012) 
  
[-0.04] [0.06]   [0.09] [-0.11]   [-0.02] [-0.14]   [0.02] [-0.07] 
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Table 3.8 Continued. 
 Black   Hispanic   Asian   White  
 Dropout Transfer  Dropout Transfer  Dropout Transfer  Dropout Transfer 
Low Inc. X Pct. Pell 0.004 -0.001  -0.011 -0.041  0.02 0.047  0.062 -0.004 
 
(0.038) (0.01)  (0.025) (0.038)  (0.02) (0.019)**  (0.06) (0.025) 
 
[-0.04] [-0.02]  [-0.02] [-0.43]  [0.07] [0.31]  [0.20] [-0.06] 
Pct. Own Race 0.003 -0.001  0.109 0.022  0.026 -0.045  -0.033 -0.005 
 
(0.004) (0.004)  (0.063)* (0.04)  (0.012)** (0.018)**  (0.010)*** (0.007) 
 
[-0.02] [-0.01]  [0.45] [0.16]  [0.14] [-0.32]  [-0.10] [-0.03] 
Constant 3.612 5.041  -6.408 5.792  -0.915 6.232  18.77 10.026 
 
(1.850)* (3.052)*   (5.995) (2.168)***   (5.048) (3.469)*   (7.105)*** (4.444)** 
Observations 110 150   50 120   50 80   40 100 
Notes: All coefficients are relative to base category of graduating from original institution within 6 years.  Robust standard errors; in 
parentheses. * significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  Average marginal effects included in brackets. Includes 
controls for gender, SAT scores, parent's education, educ. exp/student, and institution type. 
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years than to transfer or dropout, whereas White students with scores above the 
median are less likely to stay and graduate as the gap increases.  Black students with 
scores below the median are more likely to stay and graduate as this gap increases, a 
finding that is consistent with past research looking at the success of low- income 
students at more selective colleges and universities.  Low-income Black students with 
scores above the median are less likely to transfer as this gap increases.  An academic 
“mismatch” for Asian students has no effect on the probability of dropping out.  
However, Asian students with gaps above the median are less likely to transfer from 
their original institution.  Hispanic students with score gaps below the median are less 
likely to transfer from their original institution.  
Percent own race in the student body affects persistence for all sub-samples 
except Black students, but in varying ways.  As the percentage of own-race students 
increases, White students are less likely to dropout and more likely to stay and 
graduate within six years, but this effect is very small: a 10% increase in percent white 
is associated with about a one percentage point increase in the probability of 
graduating.  In contrast, an increase in the percentage of own-race students at an 
institution is linked with a higher probability that Hispanic students will dropout by 
about 4 percentage points (for a 10% increase in percent Hispanic).  Similarly, Asian 
students are more likely to dropout as percent own-race in the student body increases, 
but are also less likely to transfer from their original institution.  However, these 
effects are fairly small, a 10% increase in own-race increases the probability of 
dropping out by 1 percentage point, and decreases the probability of transferring by 3 
percentage points for Asian students.  These results suggest that social fit, as measured 
by the percentage of students of one’s own race can impact persistence but that this 
effect is very different for students of different races.  Asian and Hispanic students are 
slightly more likely to dropout with more students of their peer group around.  
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However, although percent own-race does not affect the probability of transferring for 
Hispanic students, it is linked with a decrease in the probability of transferring for 
Asian students.  Persistence of Black students does not seem to be affected at all by 
changes in their peer group size.  These results are in contrast to the findings of 
Fletcher and Tienda that an increase in same race peer group size leads to increased 
persistence (2008).  However, their measure of peer group is quite different from the 
one used in this paper, and is far more specific.  Peer group size in their paper focuses 
on students of the same race that also attended the same high school, and therefore is 
more a measure of the size of a social network that is already developed to some 
extent.  This paper focuses on the potential to form a social network amongst peers of 
one’s own race, regardless of having known each other prior to college.  Therefore, as 
these two measures are quite different, they are likely getting at different aspects of 
social fit, and it is not surprising that the results would be different.   
Peer group size defined along income lines significantly impacts persistence 
for Asian students only.  If the percentage of low-income students at an institution 
increases by 10%, low-income Asian students are more likely to transfer from their 
original institution by about 3 percentage points, but their probability of dropping out 
is not affected.  Again, although some effects of peer group size for low-income 
students were identified here, it is likely that the proxy used is not fine enough of a 
measure to accurately capture all of the effects.   
Results in Table 3.6 of multinomial logit estimations of persistence using 
NELS:88 show some similarities with a few notable differences.  In this data set, low-
income students are 11.5 percentage points more likely to drop out of college and are 
less likely to transfer by about 13 percentage points.  Less selective colleges or 
universities, as those attended by students in NELS:88, may not be able to offer as 
much financial aid to low-income students which could lead to increased stop-outs and 
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drop-outs.  There is no effect on dropping out of a gap in scores below the median, but 
this measure has a negative impact on the probability of transferring.  Low-income 
students scoring below the median are slightly more likely to transfer schools, by 
about one percentage point.  Higher-income students scoring above the median are 
more likely to drop out, but the effect on dropping out of a gap above the median for 
low-income students is virtually zero.  Similar to the results using the NLSF, there is 
no impact of low-income peer group size for low-income students.  With a few 
exceptions, the results of estimations of persistence for students attending the less 
selective sample of institutions contained in NELS:88 are qualitatively very similar to 
the results from the NLSF sample.  
 
VI. Results: Instrumental Variables Approach 
 This paper has measured the effect of an academic “mismatch” on students that 
have been admitted by and chosen to attend schools at which there exists a gap 
between their own SAT scores and the median scores of the institution.  For a student 
to enroll at a school at which they do not match academically, assuming both schools 
and students have at least partial information on the true impact this “mismatch” will 
have on the student’s outcomes, one or both of two things is likely to be true.  First, 
the college likely has identified some traits that make the student attractive to the 
university despite the test score gap or that suggest to the admissions counselor that 
the student has the ability to overcome the test score gap and succeed educationally.  
Second, the student must have selected him or herself into that mismatched position 
knowing what impact the test score gap will have on his/her outcomes.  An alternative 
measure would be to examine the effect of a “mismatch” for the average student in the 
data, removing the selection on unobservable characteristics.  An instrumental 
variables approach is used to obtain the exogenous impact of a gap in test scores on 
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grades and persistence.  The difference between a student’s SAT scores and the 
median SAT scores at the closest selective college or university to the high school the 
student attended, either above or below, are used to instrument for the actual test score 
gaps that are observed29.  Students that live closer to selective colleges and universities 
are more likely to apply to a selective institution, and distance can also play a role in 
enrollment decisions, suggesting that this choice of instrument is a reasonable one 
(Griffith & Rothstein, 2007; Griffith & Rask, 2005)30.  Estimates for first-year GPA, 
cumulative GPA, the probability of dropping out, and the probability of transferring 
for the NLSF sample using these instruments for the SAT gaps are shown in Table 
3.931.  The Two-Stage Least Squares estimate of the exogenous impact of a gap in 
SAT scores below the median on GPA measures is about three to five times larger 
than that for students that have been selected into this position.  The effect of a gap for 
low-income students also increases about three-fold such that having SAT scores 100 
points below the median results in a 0.21 point decrease in cumulative GPA for low-
income students, and an even larger decrease of 0.42 points in first-year GPA.  The 
effects of an SAT gap on dropping out remains insignificant in the instrumented model 
and now a gap in scores below the median has no effect on the probability of 
transferring.  A comparison of these results with those of the original estimations 
suggests that there is positive selection at work in the acceptance of students to 
institutions and their choice of where to enroll.  Students that enroll at institutions at 
which they are not matched well academically in terms of SAT scores are those that  
                                                 
29
 Four-year institutions are considered selective if they have median SATs greater than 1100, to 
correspond to the minimum selectivity level of the institutions included in the NLSF sample.  The IV 
results are not sensitive to this cut-off.     
30
 The F-statistics for the inclusion of the instruments in the first-stage estimations are all greater than 
150, significantly above a reasonable critical value suggesting that the instruments have significant 
explanatory power for the endogenous regressors.  All first-stage results are available from the author 
on request. 
31
 Results of IV probits are reported for both measures of persistence.  Although these results are not 
directly comparable to those of the multinomial logit estimations, they do provide suggestive evidence 
of the effect of using instruments for the measures of gaps in SAT scores. 
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Table 3.9: Instrumental Variables Estimation of GPA and Persistence Measures 
(NLSF) 
        
 GPA1  GPA  Dropout  Transfer 
Black -0.135  -0.164  0.449  0.07 
 (0.027)*** 
 
(0.021)*** 
 
(0.145)*** 
 
(0.112) 
Hispanic -0.089  -0.096  0.062  0.079 
 (0.030)*** 
 
(0.024)*** 
 
(0.163) 
 
(0.122) 
Asian -0.02  -0.028  0.172  -0.108 
 (0.022) 
 
(0.018) 
 
(0.112) 
 
(0.087) 
High School GPA 0.499  0.415  -0.352  -0.391 
 (0.042)***  (0.032)***  (0.199)*  (0.157)** 
Private High School 0.051  0.056  -0.053  -0.001 
 (0.019)***  (0.015)***  (0.089)  (0.069) 
Income< $35,000 0.03  0.032  -0.086  -0.025 
 (0.057)  (0.046)  (0.215)  (0.191) 
Income > $75,000 0.011  0.019     
 (0.024)  (0.019)     
Dist. Sat Below Median -0.355  -0.15  0.269  0.07 
 (0.155)**  (0.122)  (0.713)  (0.553) 
Low Inc. x Dist. Below 
Median -0.067  -0.061  0.186  -0.009 
 (0.026)**  (0.021)***  (0.097)*  (0.088) 
Dist. SAT above Median 0.564  0.292  -0.224  -0.139 
 (0.189)***  (0.149)*  (0.917)  (0.709) 
Low Inc. X Dist. Above 
Median -0.148  -0.028  0.505  0.084 
 (0.071)**  (0.056)  (0.269)*  (0.254) 
Pct Pell Grant -0.001  0.001  0.006  -0.004 
 (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.006)  (0.005) 
Low Inc. x PctPell 0.004  0.001  0.004  -0.002 
 (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.01)  (0.009) 
Observations 3748   3748   3910   3910 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; **significant at 5%;  *** 
significant at 1%. Includes controls for gender, SAT scores, parent's education, exp/student, 
mean and variance of institutional GPA, institution type and student's major course of study.  
Difference in SATs and median scores of nearest selective institution in high school used as 
instruments for Academic Fit measures 
 
seem to be better equipped to deal with this gap, as the effect of a test score gap on the 
grades of this group of students is much smaller than in the absence of selection.   
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VII: Results: College Major Choice 
 A Multinomial Logit Model, shown in equation (3), is used to estimate the 
probability of majoring in one of four fields - STEM, Humanities, Social Sciences or 
Economics/Business versus an alternate major in any other field.  
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Average marginal effects from multinomial logit estimations for the whole sample and 
by race are displayed in Tables 3.10 and 3.11 respectively, and the estimated 
coefficients can be found in Appendix Tables A3.1 and A3.2.  All coefficients are in 
comparison to choosing a major in any field not included in the four main fields, 
henceforth the residual major category.  Looking at the results for the whole sample, 
in Table 3.10, one can see that  Black and Hispanic students are more likely to choose 
a major in the Social Sciences, by about 3-4 percentage points.  Although the  
 
Table 3.10: Average Marginal Effects (x100) from Multinomial Logit 
Estimation of College Major Choice 
     
 STEM Humanities Soc. Sci. Bus./Econ. 
Black -1.71 -0.85 4.45 -1.73 
Hispanic -2.21 0.48 3.27 -2.19 
Asian 1.25 -2.24 -2.40 1.89 
HS GPA 9.61 0.58 2.75 -0.35 
Private HS -0.92 -0.40 1.47 -0.18 
Income <$35,000 2.54 2.24 -3.32 4.96 
Dist. Below Median -2.61 -0.27 2.34 -2.54 
Dist Above Median 1.93 -1.09 -1.45 -0.28 
Pct. Pell Grant 0.03 0.02 -0.14 0.09 
Low. Inc. X Pct. Pell -0.05 -0.12 0.27 -0.17 
Observations 690 260 570 360 
Note: Bolded average marginal effects correspond to significant coefficients in 
original multinomial logit estimation 
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coefficients are not significant, results suggest that Black and Hispanic students are 
less likely to major in a STEM or Business/Economics field, a finding similar to that 
in the literature.  Asian students are about 2 percentage points less likely to choose a 
major in the Humanities or Social Sciences.  Results show that coming from a low-
income background can affect a student’s choice of major, but in a way contrary to the 
findings of some past studies.  Low-income students are about 5 percentage points 
more likely to choose a Business/Economics major than their higher income peers.  
This difference may likely be driven by the very high level of selectivity of the 
colleges and universities in the NLSF sample.  The types of students attending these 
schools are not necessarily representative of students attending four-year institutions 
in general, and therefore one may expect differences in their major choices.  The 
farther a student’s SAT score is below the median of the institution they attend, the 
less likely they are to choose a major in STEM or Business/Economics field.  These 
are likely the higher grading majors at these institutions, and it is not surprising that 
lower test score students, as compared to their peers, would be less likely to be 
majoring in these fields.  In terms of peer group size effects, low-income students at 
schools with a higher percentage of Pell Grant students are less likely to major in the 
Humanities. 
Average marginal effects from estimations of college major choice by race are 
shown in Table 3.11.  Students of all races with higher high school GPAs are more 
likely to choose a STEM field major, although this finding is not significant for 
Hispanic students.  Income plays a role for Hispanic students only.  Low-income 
Hispanic students are more likely to major in Economics/Business or a STEM field.  
This is opposite to the finding for the whole sample, and the findings of the literature, 
but past studies have not looked as specifically at students of different races. 
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Table 3.11: Average Marginal Effects (x100) from Multinomial Logit Estimation of College Major Choice by 
Race 
          
 Black  Hispanic 
 STEM Humanities Soc. Sci. Bus./Econ.  STEM Humanities Soc. Sci. Bus/Econ 
HS GPA 14.13 -0.26 4.78 0.77  5.36 -2.68 0.04 0.42 
Private HS -0.25 -3.09 2.41 -0.10  0.50 0.05 0.92 0.94 
Income <$35,000 -1.97 5.74 -0.08 4.65  7.51 -3.32 -0.58 5.37 
Dist. Below Median -0.71 -0.75 0.56 -1.79  -0.70 -1.85 0.52 0.00 
Dist Above Median 2.23 -1.32 -4.53 -0.61  4.04 2.67 -1.62 -4.32 
Pct. Pell Grant -0.30 -0.07 -0.12 0.60  0.20 -0.05 -0.19 0.10 
Low. Inc. X Pct. Pell 0.12 -0.22 -0.07 -0.16  -0.11 -0.03 0.00 0.02 
Pct Own Race -0.09 0.04 -0.05 0.05   -0.41 0.69 1.74 -0.62 
Observations 140 60 180 70   140 70 150 70 
 Asian  White 
 STEM Humanities Soc. Sci. Bus/Econ  STEM Humanities Soc. Sci. Bus/Econ 
HS GPA 8.44 -0.14 3.64 -4.28  6.97 6.44 -0.57 1.93 
Private HS -2.02 1.73 2.55 -1.05  -2.24 -0.12 1.00 -0.16 
Income <$35,000 7.53 -0.28 -4.58 2.82  -8.32 0.81 -10.02 27.05 
Dist. Below Median 0.48 3.66 -0.87 -1.55  1.47 -3.79 -0.47 -6.22 
Dist Above Median -2.26 -3.33 0.38 -0.33  0.73 0.40 2.91 -3.73 
Pct. Pell Grant 0.20 0.07 -0.47 0.00  0.38 0.11 -0.25 -0.06 
Low. Inc. X Pct. Pell -0.19 -0.13 0.52 -0.28  0.37 0.12 0.98 -1.28 
Pct Own Race -0.49 -0.29 0.42 0.08   0.12 -0.21 -0.04 0.33 
Observations 210 60 110 120   200 80 130 100 
Note: Bolded average marginal effects correspond to significant coefficients in original multinomial logit estimation 
 
 
  
Results by race suggest that peer group size can play an important role in 
major choice.  Low-income Asian and White students are more likely to choose a 
Social Science major as the percentage of low-income students at their institution 
increases.  Peer group size in terms of race also affects college major choice, but 
somewhat differently for students of each race group.  As the percent of Black 
students in the student body increases by 10%, Black students are about 1 percentage 
point less likely to choose a STEM major, and about 0.5 percentage points more likely 
to choose a Business/Economics major.  Although the coefficients were not significant 
in the whole sample estimation, Black students were slightly less likely to major in a 
STEM field or Business/Economics.  Therefore these results suggest that an increase 
in their racial peer group size further decreases the probability that a Black student 
will choose a STEM field major, but slightly increases the probability of majoring in 
Business/Economics.  Similarly, an increase in racial peer group size for Asian 
students decreases their probability of major in a STEM field and increases their 
probability of majoring in a Social Science, but also decreases the probability of 
choosing a Humanities major.  Although changes in peer group size have similar 
distributional effects on Asian and Black students, the size of the effects are much 
larger for Asian students, suggesting that they are possibly more sensitive to changes 
in the racial distribution in terms of their major choice.  Hispanic students react 
slightly differently to changes in the racial distribution.  As the percentage of Hispanic 
students increases, Hispanic students are much more likely to choose a major in the 
Social Sciences.  An increase of 10% for peer group size leads to a 17 percentage 
point increase in the probability a Hispanic student will choose a Social Science 
major, a fairly large effect.    
These findings on college major choice suggest that although measures of 
institutional fit can have an impact on college major choice, it is mostly personal 
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characteristics like test scores that drive the decision-making process.  However, social 
fit can have an impact on major choice, although it is unclear exactly what mechanism 
is at work.  An increase in the percentage of the student body that comes from one’s 
own racial group has an important impact on course-taking behavior and college major 
choice, but this effect differs in both distributional impact and size between the main 
racial groups.     
 
VIII. Conclusion 
In the past years there has been a push to increase access for minority students 
to the more selective colleges and universities in the U.S, with a recent push focused 
on low-income students.  However, very little is actually known about the factors 
which affect the educational outcomes of these students while in college, and in 
particular how the fit between students and the institutions they attend can impact 
outcomes.  A large fraction of minority and low-income students attending selective 
institutions begin their post-secondary experiences at institutions with median SAT 
scores well above their own personal scores.  In addition, the socioeconomic and 
demographic composition of most selective institutions is such that low-income and 
minority students are faced with very small peer groups, as defined by income or race, 
at their college of choice.  This paper uses restricted-access data from both the NLSF 
and NELS:88 to examine how educational outcomes of low-income and minority 
students are impacted by two different measures of institutional fit, academic and 
social.  This first measure of fit examines how well students fare educationally if there 
are large gaps between their own SAT scores and the median scores of the institution 
they attend.  The second measure examines whether social fit along race and income 
lines can impact educational outcomes and choices.  The formation of social networks 
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may be affected by the size of peer groups defined in this way, which may in turn 
impact educational outcomes and choices.   
Results are summarized in Table 3.12.  They suggest that academic fit can 
have a significant negative impact on a student’s first-year and cumulative GPA, but 
this total effect is very small in a policy sense.  The impact on GPA of having a gap in 
SAT scores below the median is greater for low-income students, a significant finding 
given that low-income students are much more likely to be in this position and those 
that are have much larger gaps between their own scores and the institutional median 
Table 3.12: Summary of Results for GPA and Persistence using NLSF and 
NELS:88 
 All Black Hispanic Asian White 
Low-
Income 
+  Dropout 
(NELS) 
(-) Transfer 
(NELS) 
 + Dropout + GPA1  
Score Gap 
Below 
(-) GPA1 & 
GPA 
(-) Transfer 
(-) GPA1 
(-) Dropout 
(-) GPA1 
(-) Transfer 
(-)GPA (-) GPA1 & 
GPA 
(-) Dropout 
(-) Transfer 
Low-
Income X 
Score Gap 
Below 
(-) GPA  
+ GPA1 & 
GPA (NELS) 
+ Transfer 
(NELS) 
(-) GPA1 & 
GPA 
 (-) GPA1 & 
GPA 
 
+ GPA1 
Score Gap 
Above 
+ GPA1 & 
GPA 
+ Dropout 
(NELS) 
+ GPA1 & 
GPA 
+ Grad 
+ GPA1 & 
GPA 
(-) Dropout 
+ GPA1 & 
GPA 
+ Transfer 
+ GPA1 & 
GPA 
+ Dropout 
+ Transfer 
Low-
Income X 
Score Gap 
Above 
 (-) GPA1 & 
GPA 
(-) Transfer 
+ GPA (-) GPA1 & 
GPA 
+ Dropout 
Low-
Income X 
Pct. Pell 
   + Transfer  
Pct. Own 
Race 
 + GPA1 
 
+ Dropout (-) GPA1 & 
GPA 
+ Dropout 
(-) Transfer 
(-) Dropout 
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on average.  This additional impact of low test scores on GPA for low-income students 
suggests that these students are less prepared than the average student to deal with an 
academic mismatch, most likely due to fewer resources dedicated to their education 
prior to college.  However, a “mismatch” in terms of test scores does not have a 
negative effect on persistence; students with large test score gaps below the median 
are less likely to transfer institutions and are not any more likely to dropout.  Citing 
results of other studies, low-income students attending a selective institution with 
median SAT scores 100 points higher will on average have earnings that are 4% 
higher.  This increase in median SAT scores, relative to their own personal scores is 
associated with a decrease in college GPA, leading to earnings that are less than 1% 
lower.  Therefore, the direct positive effect on earnings of attending a more selective 
institution outweighs the indirect negative effect operating through lower college 
GPAs for these students.    
As the increase in earnings associated with persistence outweighs the change in 
earnings associated with grades, one might be more concerned with whether students 
ultimately graduate, despite how they perform in terms of grades while enrolled in 
college.  Therefore, the results for low-income students are somewhat reassuring; after 
controlling for background characteristics, low-income students are not any less likely 
to graduate within six years, and their location in the test score distribution at their 
institution does not negatively impact their probability of graduating.  However, 
despite controlling for other personal characteristics and gaps in test scores, Black 
students are still more likely to dropout, and Black and Hispanic students are more 
likely to transfer from their original institution and earn lower GPAs.    
 A comparison of estimations of GPA and persistence using the very selective 
NLSF sample and the more representative NELS:88 data set suggest that the results 
regarding the importance of academic fit between a student and the institution they 
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attend are not specific to highly selective schools.  Results show that students entering 
college with SAT scores well below the median of the institution they attend suffer in 
terms of GPA at colleges across a wide range of selectivity and there is evidence that a 
gap in SAT scores has a stronger impact at more selective schools.  Therefore, the 
GPAs of students with fairly high SAT scores attending institutions with median 
scores 100 points above their own will be impacted more than those of students with 
lower SAT scores that are 100 points below the median of the institution they attend. 
 Results of instrumental variables estimations show that the students that have 
been accepted by and chosen to attend colleges or universities at which their SAT 
scores are far below the median experience a much smaller decrease in GPA than 
would the average student with a given SAT score placed in a position of “mismatch” 
with their institution.  Admissions counselors have access to information that could 
predict a student’s probability of academic success that is not observable to the 
researcher, such as evidence of a high level of motivation and dedication to their 
studies which may come through in letters of recommendation.  Schools therefore may 
admit students with low test scores but high levels of these “unobservable” traits.  
Students are also aware, at least to some extent, of their ability to succeed in different 
academic situations, and those that choose to enroll at a school at which their scores 
are far below the median are likely those that are fairly sure they can handle the 
challenging academic atmosphere.  The existence of a much smaller effect of a test 
score gap for the population of students that select into this situation suggests that the 
admissions and enrollment process is doing a fairly good job of identifying which 
students can handle a test score gap and students are doing a good job of sorting into 
schools to maximize their academic success.  However, there is still a slight negative 
impact of an academic “mismatch,” for which there are two probable explanations.  It 
may just be that this process of identifying which students can handle a test score gap 
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is not perfect, as neither students nor schools likely have perfect information, resulting 
in a slight loss for “mismatched” students.  An alternative explanation is that schools 
may value other traits that a researcher cannot observe that low test score students may 
exhibit, and are willing to trade a little bit of scholastic merit to achieve this diversity 
in their student body.  Either explanation would produce the results shown here, and it 
is likely that both are at work.   
 Peer group size defined along income lines does not seem to have a significant 
impact on GPA or persistence.  The one exception is for low-income Asian students, 
who are more likely to transfer as the percentage of the student body that is low-
income increases.  However, it should be noted that this measure is very broad, and 
only measures percentages in the entire student body.  At large schools, this may not 
very accurately measure the percentage of low-income students within the student 
population that these students come into contact with on a daily basis.  It is possible 
that although no effects were found here, there are actually significant effects of 
income peer group size on grades and persistence.  Peer group size defined by race 
does significantly impact both grades and persistence.  Asian students receive lower 
grades, but are more likely to dropout and less likely to transfer as the percentage of 
Asian students at their institution increases.  Black students receive slightly higher 
grades as the percentage of Black students increases, but own-race peer group size 
does not affect persistence for Black students.  The grades of Hispanic students are not 
affected by peer group size, but they are more likely to dropout as peer group size 
increases. 
 There is a significant impact of peer group size on choice of college major.  
Results from the NLSF show that as the percentage of Pell Grant recipients increases, 
Hispanic students are more likely to major in Business/Economics, mitigating the 
negative direct effect of coming from a low-income background on the choice of this 
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major field.  Percentage of the student body that comes from one’s own racial group 
can also affect major choice for all three non-white racial groups, although the 
distributional effects across major fields are different across racial groups.  As peer 
group size changes, students may form social networks with very different 
compositions, and therefore be influenced to take different types of courses, leading to 
different major choices.   
 A large percentage of low-income and minority students may earn slightly 
lower GPAs during their post-secondary experience due to low test scores upon 
matriculation, however, the wage premium associated with graduating from a selective 
institution outweighs this small negative effect on grades.  Although gaps in test 
scores and peer group size can partly explain the much lower grades and rates of 
persistence of Black and Hispanic students, these measures along with the other 
personal and institutional characteristics fail to explain all of these differences.  Black 
and Hispanic students are still more likely to dropout or transfer, and receive lower 
grades.  These findings suggest that there is still room for improvement and perhaps 
additional educational programs are needed to help compensate for the lower average 
level of preparation of low-income and minority students and to help these students 
adjust to their social and educational surroundings at college.  Further research is 
needed to examine what else may impact the educational outcomes of minority 
students, and if these factors are something that policy can address.  Finally, as the 
socioeconomic and racial composition of colleges and universities change, it is 
important to consider how this will impact major choice, as this helps determine the 
supply of new workers in the major fields.  Results from this paper suggest that these 
changes in composition can have important implications for major choice, and that 
these effects differ for students of different races. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
KEEPING UP WITH THE JONESES: INSTITUTIONAL CHANGES FOLLOWING 
THE ADOPTION OF A MERIT AID POLICY 
 
 
I. Introduction  
 
   The adoption of a policy of awarding financial aid based on merit, as opposed 
to strictly need-based aid, has increased markedly at private colleges and universities 
over the last two decades.  This increased use of merit aid by private colleges and 
universities has been a popular topic of discussion by educators, researchers and the 
press.  Merit aid is often used by many private colleges and universities seeking to 
increase their enrollments of high test score students in order to boost the quality of 
their student bodies.  It is well documented that test scores, such as SAT and ACT 
scores, are highly correlated with income and race.  Many fear that merit based awards 
will go mainly to higher income and non-minority students, leading to a decrease in 
the enrollment of low-income students, as well as possibly students from under-
represented minority groups.  In a 2006 study, Heller estimates that greater than 60% 
of institutionally offered merit aid went to students with family incomes above the 
median, and 13% went to students from families earning greater than $125,000.  If 
financial aid funds must be split between merit-based awards and need-based aid and 
many if not most of the merit-based awards are going to higher-income students, there 
will be fewer funds available to subsidize the costs of attendance for low-income 
students.  This seems to be a reality for many financial aid offices - a 2003 study by 
the Lumina Foundation reports anecdotes from college administrators indicating that 
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there is often a trade-off occurring between need and merit in financial aid decisions at 
some institutions.  
 However, it may be the case that the use of merit aid by private institutions 
does not have a negative impact on the enrollment of low-income students.  Some 
argue that merit aid can actually help to improve the financial situation of an 
institution by bringing in more “almost full-pay” students (Bowen et. al, 2005).  In this 
case, on average the merit awards do go to higher income students, but they do not 
fully subsidize the cost of attendance and as enrollment goes up, net tuition revenues 
could go up as a result.  This increased revenue could then be used to increase the 
quality of the institution and/or to increase need-based financial aid.  The 2003 
Lumina Foundation report shows that some colleges and universities report using 
merit aid as a tool to increase enrollment and fill their classes to capacity.  A 2006 
case study examining one such institution showed that following the introduction of 
merit aid there was an increase in tuition revenues as well as an increase in the 
representation of low-income students (Scannell, 2006).    
There is also the concern that in order to provide merit aid, institutions might 
need to divert funds originally intended for other areas than just need-based aid, such 
as for increases in faculty salaries, or hiring of full-time faculty versus adjunct faculty.  
Colleges also might use increases in tuition or other fees such as room & board to 
cover the increase in spending on merit-based financial aid.  Diverting funds in these 
ways may impact educational outcomes and direct costs to students, and therefore it is 
important to understand how the introduction of merit-aid programs can affect 
spending patterns at institutions. 
This paper will help to shed light on these questions by first examining what 
factors influence an institution’s decision to begin offering merit-based aid.  The paper 
then continues by examining how the socio-economic and demographic composition 
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of the student bodies at private four-year colleges and universities change following 
the introduction of a merit aid policy, and by investigating whether the use of merit aid 
is successful in that its adoption is followed by increases in the quality of the student 
body and/or by enrolling larger classes, and lastly, by exploring what trade-offs 
institutions may be making in order to fund their merit awards.   
Private colleges and universities respond to low growth in the median SAT 
scores of their freshmen classes as compared to their peer institutions by introducing a 
merit aid program.  The results suggest that there is a decrease in the representation of 
low-income students after schools begin offering merit aid, and a redistribution of 
Black students from top schools to bottom ranked schools.  However, the sizes of 
these effects are different for colleges of different initial quality.  The use of merit aid 
is associated with modest gains in median SAT scores of the incoming class, 
particularly for middle tier colleges.  In terms of changes in spending in other areas, 
the use of merit aid is associated with an increase in tuition for middle and bottom tier 
schools, and a slight decrease in associate and full professor salaries at top-tier 
schools.  These results suggest that the use of merit-aid may lead to an increase in the 
under-representation of low-income and minority students at private four-year colleges 
and universities and that for some institutions funds may also be diverted to fund these 
scholarships which could result in negative impacts on student outcomes.   
This paper proceeds as follows.  Section II reviews the literature in the area 
and discusses in more detail the questions I will test.  Section III contains descriptive 
statistics, followed by results in Section IV, and in Section V, I conclude. 
 
II. Background  
 With the expansion in the use of merit-based financial aid, there has been an 
accompanying increase in research focused in this area.  However, at this point most 
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research has focused on state merit aid programs and specifically, the Georgia HOPE 
scholarship.  This program was designed to increase enrollment of college-able 
students at colleges and universities in Georgia, and also to entice students to remain 
in state to pursue their post-secondary degrees.  As a result, much of the research 
focusing on this program and other state programs like it, have examined the 
enrollment impacts, and how these effects are distributed across different sub-
populations of students32.  Singell and coauthors (2006) use Pell grant data to show 
that the introduction of the Georgia HOPE scholarship did lead to an increase in 
access to higher education for low-income students.  However, in a 2000 paper, 
Dynarski shows that while the HOPE scholarship program was successful in its goal 
to increase enrollment, there was very little of an effect for low-income and Black 
students who often were not eligible for the award due to low test scores.  A later 
paper examining similar merit aid programs in other states showed more favorable 
enrollment effects for Black and Hispanic students (Dynarski, 2003).  Results of 
another study examining the response of four-year colleges and universities to the 
introduction of the Georgia HOPE scholarship show that institutions reacted by 
increasing tuition and other fees (Long, 2004).  Although the Georgia HOPE 
scholarship, and other state programs like it, has very different goals, the results of 
these studies show that the impacts of merit-based aid may not be distributed evenly 
across income and race groups.  These studies also provide evidence of one way in 
which institutions may respond to an increase in spending on aid – increases in tuition. 
 Research examining the effects of institutionally funded merit aid awards by 
four-year colleges and universities is much more limited, mostly due to the scarcity of 
data on institutional spending on merit aid.  A 2006 paper by Ehrenberg, Zhang and 
                                                 
32
 For other examples of work examining effects of the Georgia HOPE scholarship see Cornwell et al., 
2006 and Cornwell & Mustard, 2005.  
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Levin investigates how the use of institutionally funded National Merit Scholarships 
affects the enrollment of students that receive a Pell Grant.  Their results show that 
institutions that fund National Merit Scholarships for their enrolled students that have 
earned them enroll fewer Pell Grant recipients, a proxy for the number of low-income 
students.  Although this is a specific type of institutionally funded merit-based 
financial aid these results show that institutionally funded aid programs based on 
academic merit can lead to a crowd-out of lower-income students.   
 If the introduction of institutionally funded merit aid awards at private colleges 
and universities also leads to a reallocation of funds from other sources to financial 
aid, this may impact educational outcomes of students.  One possible way this could 
happen is if colleges or universities increase the use of part-time or adjunct faculty for 
teaching in order to cut costs on faculty salaries which may negatively impact 
students’ grades and persistence.  Ehrenberg and Zhang (2005) find that colleges or 
universities that employ more adjunct professors have lower persistence rates of 
students into their second year.  Students that are taught mostly by this type of 
professor that by definition does not have as strong of a tie to the college or university, 
and in some cases may be less qualified than a tenure-track professor, may not be as 
satisfied with their academic experience and therefore are less likely to persist into 
their second year.  Using administrative data from the public higher education system 
in Ohio, Bettinger and Long in a 2006 paper find similar evidence that taking more 
classes taught by adjunct professors is associated with lower persistence rates for 
students.  However, they find that there also might be some positive impacts of 
adjunct professors in that they can increase the probability of taking future courses in 
the subject taught, particularly in fields such as engineering and education (Bettinger 
& Long, 2007).  
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 Institutions may also cut back on spending on faculty salaries in order to help 
fund merit aid awards.  Lower real faculty salaries, or smaller raises, could lead to an 
increase in turnover of high quality faculty who are already employed by the 
university (Ehrenberg et al., 1991).  Additionally, these colleges and universities will 
likely find hiring of high quality new faculty to be difficult as outside options will now 
be more attractive.  This could possibly lead to a decrease in faculty quality, which 
could in turn impact student outcomes.   This paper will examine how student body 
characteristics, faculty salaries, tuition and fees levels, and percent of the faculty that 
are adjuncts are impacted by the use of institutionally offered merit aid.  Additionally, 
I will investigate how the effect of merit aid on these outcomes may differ for colleges 
and universities of different quality levels.  The results shed light on the perhaps 
unintended consequences of merit-based financial aid. 
 
III. Data and Descriptive Statistics 
 To examine the choice to offer merit aid and to evaluate the effects of the use 
of merit-based financial aid by private colleges and universities, this paper uses data 
from the College Board’s Annual Survey of Colleges for the years of 1987-2005.  Each 
year the College Board sends a survey to institutions that includes a set of questions 
regarding their financial aid practices.  The survey specifically asks the institution to 
report if they award non-need based financial aid that is based on academic merit.  
This paper focuses on private four-year colleges and universities as public colleges 
and universities are more limited in their control over their funding sources and 
spending.  I restrict the sample to private four-year colleges that report in the 
beginning of the sample period (1987) that they do not offer financial aid based on 
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merit33.  By doing this, I have defined the set of 133 private four-year schools that are 
“at-risk” of offering merit aid in order to compare characteristics before and after the 
addition of merit aid.  A majority of private four-year colleges and universities were 
already offering merit aid when the data window opens in 1987 and as a result the 
remaining set of “at-risk” institutions is fairly small.  However, as much of the 
concern regarding the effects of merit aid policies are focused on the institutions that 
have switched to merit aid in the last two decades, this sample should capture the 
population of interest.  There are 40 schools that never begin offering aid and 93 
schools that begin offering merit aid during the nineteen year time period.  This paper 
follows these schools through the sample period, observing the year in which they 
begin offering aid.  This information is used to define at each point in time how many 
years an institution has offered merit aid. 
 Data on student body characteristics, and institutional characteristics and 
spending are merged in from a number of sources.  The percentage of students 
receiving a Pell Grant is obtained from the Pell Grant Recipients data and is used to 
proxy for the percentage of low-income students at each institution in each year.  The 
racial composition of each college or university is derived from the Integrated 
Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS), a product of the National Center for 
Education Statistics (NCES).  Measures of student body quality and application pool 
quality such as 75th percentile SAT scores and median SAT scores of incoming 
freshmen34, number of applicants, admit rate and yield rate come from the College 
Board data set, as does the percent of enrolled freshmen from outside the U.S.  
Institutional costs and spending data, including tuition, room & board, and average 
                                                 
33
 The sample of private four-year colleges and universities excludes post-secondary institutions 
specializing in the study of music or the arts, and religious seminaries.  
34
 What is referred to as the median SAT score is actually calculated as the midpoint of the interquartile 
range.  
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salary by faculty rank, come from IPEDS.  Finally, the percent of faculty employed 
part-time is derived from IPEDS data.   
 Figure 3.1 shows the percentage of private four-year colleges and universities 
in the sample offering merit-based financial aid for each year in the sample period, 
1987-2005.  The trends are also shown for each tier.  Tiers are defined using median 
SAT scores of the student body at the start of the sample period to partition the 
complete sample of private four-year institutions into terciles.35  By definition, no  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1: Percent of private four-year colleges and universities offering merit-
based financial aid: 1987-2005. 
                                                 
35
 More specifically, the median SAT scores in 1987 of all private four-year colleges and universities 
reporting complete merit-aid data for the sample period, including those that offer merit for the entire 
period, were used to break the sample into terciles.  Bottom tier schools have SAT scores below 1020, 
Middle Tier schools have SAT scores between 1020 and 1110, and Top Tier schools have SAT scores 
greater than or equal to 1110.  All SAT scores prior to 1996 were re-centered using the crosswalk 
provided by the College Board.  If SAT scores were missing in 1987, 1988 values were used if 
available, or if not, SATs were imputed using expenditures per student, urbanicity, % residential, and 
student body size. 
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institutions in the sample were offering merit aid in 1987.  There is a fairly steep and 
steady increase for the whole sample, and as a result, in 2005 about 70% of the top tier 
colleges and universities in the sample have started offering merit aid.  The bulk of 
this increase comes from schools in the bottom and middle tiers, as about 50% of the 
schools report offering merit aid in 2005, whereas over 90% of mid-tier schools offer 
merit aid in 2005.  One of the main hypothesized motivations behind the use of merit-
based financial aid is to attract more high ability students to enroll at one’s institution. 
Bottom and mid-tier schools have the most incentive to do this in order to move up in 
the hierarchy of private four-year colleges and universities by enrolling a higher 
quality student body.  However, top-tier colleges may decide to begin offering merit 
aid as a way to stay competitive and to retain high-ability students as more and more 
colleges around them are trying to steal these students away.  Figure 3.1 illustrates that 
there has been a strong movement by private four-year colleges and universities 
towards merit-based financial aid.  When weighted by the size of the undergraduate 
student body, the trends look very similar, showing that there is not a specific pattern 
over time to the size of schools that have decided to begin offering merit aid.   
 Descriptive statistics for the outcome variables of interest are shown in Tables 
4.1a and 4.1b.  Mean values are reported for the beginning and end of the sample 
period, as is the percent change in each variable over the time period for the whole 
sample of schools and by tier.  The percentage of students receiving Pell Grants has 
increased by 15% over the sample period.  The majority of this increase has occurred 
in the mid-tier and bottom tier schools.  Although there has been a fairly large increase 
in percent Pell over the time period, low-income students still make up a much smaller 
proportion of the upper-tier schools; only 14% of the student body at top tier schools 
as compared to almost 48% at bottom tier schools.  The percentage of Hispanic  
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Table 4.1a: Descriptive Statistics for Outcome Variables in 1987 and 2005 for main 
sample and by tier 
        
Variable  
All 
Schools    
Bottom 
Tier  
 1987 2005 
% 
Change  1987 2005 
% 
Change 
Pct. Pell 23.48 27.07 15%  39.97 47.03 18% 
 
(21.63) (21.65)   (25.07) (25.70)  
Pct. Black 13.31 13.74 3%  30.93 31.06 0% 
 
(27.76) (26.18)   (41.94) (39.68)  
Pct. Hispanic 2.63 5.02 91%  2.65 4.48 69% 
 
(5.36) (5.03)   (8.92) (7.55)  
Pct. Asian 3.78 6.02 59%  2.05 2.50 22% 
 
(6.69) (7.77)   (9.34) (8.42)  
# Applicants 3467 4490 29%  554 1207 118% 
 
(4219) (5292)   (528) (1268)  
# Freshmen 474 546 15%  186 220 18% 
 
(467) (519)   (165) (204)  
Median SAT 1153 1174 2%  953 954 0% 
 (153) (195)   (48) (132)  
75th Percentile 
SAT 1257 1275 1%  1067 1069 0% 
 (148) (187)   (54) (140)  
Admit Rate 58.81 54.68 -7%  83.33 68.71 -18% 
 
(23.39) (24.91)   (10.63) (23.93)  
Yield 46.20 40.15 -13%  54.15 47.86 -12% 
 
(15.49) (18.32)   (18.95) (25.71)  
% Foreign 
Freshmen 3.35 4.24 26%  2.35 2.85 21% 
 
(3.38) (3.17)   (3.70) (1.86)  
% FT Students 83.24 88.28 6%  70.48 77.09 9% 
 
(20.21) (17.32)   (26.44) (24.19)  
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Table 4.1a Continued. 
        
Variable  
All 
Schools    
Bottom 
Tier  
 1987 2005 % Change  1987 2005 
% 
Change 
Room & 
Board 6044 7821 29%  4639 5553 20% 
 
(1573) (2129)   (1328) (1771)  
Tuition 13750 22348 63%  7113 12855 81% 
 
(6184) (8627)   (2679) (4301)  
% PT 
Faculty 30.38 35.87 18%  34.79 44.71 28% 
 
(16.24) (21.95)   (16.78) (22.32)  
Avg. Asst. 
Prof Salary 43949 52905 20%  32418 40621 25% 
 
(11127) (13417)   (7752) (7656)  
Avg. Assoc. 
Prof Salary 54645 63813 17%  39068 47101 21% 
 
(14299) (16985)   (8675) (8862)  
Avg. Prof. 
Salary 71750 83821 17%  45132 55464 23% 
 
(24132) (31053)   (13764) (15341)  
Observations 133 133     43 43   
Note:  Reported statistics for 1987 race variables are from 1988.  All dollar amounts are 
in 2005 dollars.  Median SATs before 1996 were adjusted for re-centering.  Tiers are 
defined by reported Median SAT scores in 1987: Bottom Tier schools have SAT scores 
less than 1020, Middle Tier schools have SAT scores between 1020 and 1110, and Top 
Tier schools have SAT scores greater than or equal to 1110.   
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Table 4.1b: Descriptive Statistics for Outcome Variables in 1987 and 2005 for main 
sample and by tier 
        
Variable  
Middle 
Tier    Top Tier  
 1987 2005 
% 
Change  1987 2005 
% 
Change 
Pct. Pell 22.84 26.46 16%  12.71 13.94 10% 
 
(16.50) (14.64)   (12.78) (5.25)  
Pct. Black 6.82 8.40 23%  3.97 4.64 17% 
 
(16.51) (16.50)   (2.31) (2.30)  
Pct. Hispanic 1.80 3.86 114%  3.00 5.94 98% 
 
(2.12) (2.91)   (2.21) (3.33)  
Pct. Asian 2.64 4.68 77%  5.55 9.03 63% 
 
(5.26) (8.14)   (4.30) (5.83)  
# Applicants 1461 2604 78%  5055 6956 38% 
 
(900) (1857)   (4777) (6289)  
# Freshmen 413 515 25%  697 775 11% 
 
(269) (302)   (558) (620)  
Median SAT 1061 1111 5%  1273 1327 4% 
 (23) (108)   (87) (100)  
75th Percentile 
SAT 1176 1209 3%  1365 1420 4% 
 (31) (92)   (97) (95)  
Admit Rate 71.92 68.59 -5%  46.86 41.40 -12% 
 
(15.72) (15.76)   (20.18) (21.61)  
Yield 48.10 35.99 -25%  43.20 38.49 -11% 
 
(17.40) (16.93)   (12.80) (13.47)  
% Foreign 
Freshmen 3.45 3.00 -13%  4.02 5.05 26% 
 
(3.96) (3.24)   (2.65) (3.15)  
% FT Students 80.82 88.64 10%  93.38 95.63 2% 
 
(13.46) (9.38)   (10.04) (8.83)  
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Table 4.1b Continued. 
        
Variable  
Middle 
Tier    
Top 
Tier  
 1987 2005 
% 
Change  1987 2005 
% 
Change 
Room & Board 5888 7758 32%  6824 8902 30% 
 
(1634) (2184)   (1091) (1266)  
Tuition 11742 21172 80%  18624 29886 60% 
 
(4894) (5615)   (3285) (3625)  
% PT Faculty 38.72 48.32 25%  23.34 24.17 4% 
 
(14.01) (22.60)   (14.07) (14.42)  
Avg. Asst. Prof 
Salary 40909 49788 22%  52156 62305 19% 
 
(7212) (10197)   (6731) (10308)  
Avg. Assoc. 
Prof Salary 48216 60022 24%  65331 76163 17% 
 
(11555) (13721)   (7037) (11613)  
Avg. Prof. 
Salary 60233 72555 20%  89250 107463 20% 
 
(16859) (21923)   
(14323
) (23336)  
Observations 29 29     61 61   
Note:  Reported statistics for 1987 race variables are from 1988.  All dollar amounts 
are in 2005$.  Median SATs before 1996 were adjusted for re-centering.  Tiers are 
defined by reported Median SAT scores in 1987: Bottom Tier schools have SAT 
scores less than 1020, Middle Tier schools have SAT scores between 1020 and 1110, 
and Top Tier schools have SAT scores greater than or equal to 1110.    
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students enrolled has grown significantly over time, and the bulk of this increase has 
occurred at mid-tier and top tier schools.  Despite the increases, in 2005 Hispanic 
students make up only 5% of the student bodies at the schools in the sample.  There is 
a very similar pattern for the increase in representation of Asian students. Although 
there has been very little increase in the percentage of Black students enrolled at 
schools in the sample, there have been large percentage increases in the top two tiers. 
Black students are much more highly represented in the student bodies at bottom tier 
schools than at top tier schools, 31% in the bottom tier versus only 5 % in the top tier. 
 Applicant pools have increased quite a bit over the sample period, especially at 
bottom tier schools (over 100%).  However they are still significantly larger at top tier 
schools.  This is hardly surprising, as the top tier colleges are the most in demand by 
students, especially high ability students, and they are also on average larger schools 
with more slots for freshmen students.  It may also be that this jump in applications for 
middle tier schools is partly driven by the increased use of the common application by 
these schools (Liu, et. al, 2007).  Although the applicant pool has grown steadily, the 
size of the freshmen class has not grown at the same rate.  As a result, admit rates have 
fallen over time.  Interestingly, yield rates have also fallen over time.  This may also 
be a result of the “apply everywhere” philosophy that seems to have taken hold in 
recent years.  Admitted students may have more options of where to enroll, and 
therefore the probability of enrolling a particular admitted student may be falling.  
Schools in the sample enroll a small percentage of foreign freshmen, 4% in 2005, but 
there has been an increase over time for the bottom and top tier schools.  The majority 
of the student bodies at the schools in the sample are composed of full-time students 
and this percentage has increased slightly over time for all schools.    
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 In terms of charges, both room & board and tuition have increased 
significantly during the sample period.  Changes in room & board charges have been 
comparable across tiers, at around a 20-30% change in charges, although the average 
charges do go up as you move up a tier36.  Tuition charges follow the same pattern in 
terms of means, but the large increases in tuition have occurred mostly at the bottom 
and middle tier colleges and universities.  Despite these big increases in the bottom 
two tiers, the tuition levels at top tier schools are still significantly higher, with an 
average of almost $30,000 for top tier schools in 2005 versus only $13,000 at bottom 
tier schools and $21,000 at middle tier schools.   
 Colleges in all three tiers have seen similar percent increases in average faculty 
salaries.  As with tuition, top tier colleges and universities have much higher average 
salaries at every rank than do colleges and universities from the bottom two tiers.  Top 
tier schools employ more of their faculty full-time than do schools from the bottom 
two tiers.  On average, 24% of the faculty at top-tier schools is employed part-time, 
versus 44-48% at bottom and middle tier schools. 
 The descriptive statistics in Tables 4.1a & 4.1b show that for both types of 
colleges in the main sample, those that begin offering aid at some point during the 
time period, and those that never do (for ease of discussion I will refer to them as 
Change and Never schools) there are definite time trends for all of the variables of 
interest.  This does not, however, tell us if the practice of offering merit aid affects 
these variables, and by how much.  Figure 4.2 shows the percentage of the student 
body that receives Pell Grants by the number of years since or until merit aid is first 
offered, for all of the Change schools and also separated by tier.  There are fewer 
schools with many years of observations before they began offering merit aid causing 
the trends to be very jumpy before year zero, and then smooth out considerably.  
                                                 
36
 All dollar amounts have been adjusted for inflation and are reported in constant 2005 dollars.   
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Despite the jumpy nature of the percentages before merit aid is offered, there is a 
distinct pattern that emerges at year 0.  For all three tiers there is a somewhat steady 
increase in percent Pell in the years leading up to the introduction of the merit aid 
policy, and then starting at year zero, this incline flattens out and may even start to 
reverse about 10 years following the policy change.  This pattern, although not 
showing a strict decline in percent Pell following the policy change, does provide 
descriptive evidence that there was an effect on the income distribution of students 
following the switch to merit aid. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.2: Average % Pell Grant Recipients for all schools that began offering 
merit aid after 1987 by # years and by tier. 
 As mentioned previously, a likely main motivation for offering merit-based aid 
is to increase the quality of the student body by attracting more high-scoring students 
to enroll.  Figure 4.3 shows the median SAT scores of the incoming freshman class by 
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the number of years until or since merit aid is first offered.  There is no clear pattern 
relating the number of years offering merit aid and the average median SAT scores, so 
perhaps these policies are if anything, only moderately successful in actually 
increasing the quality of the student body.  It is also possible that instead of increasing 
student body quality, the policies work to maintain student body quality such that in 
the absence of such a financial aid program the institutions would have experienced 
decreases in their median SAT scores.  A more formal regression analysis is required 
to examine this relationship.  The next section examines empirically whether the 
descriptive relationships that do appear remain after controlling for other 
characteristics.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
Figure 4.3: Average Median SAT scores for all schools that began offering merit 
aid after 1987 by # years and by tier. 
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IV. Empirical Methods and Results 
A. Factors Affecting the Decision to Offer Merit Aid 
This paper has put forth a number of hypotheses in the introduction as to why 
private four-year colleges might begin to offer merit-based financial aid.  To examine 
the factors that affect this choice I estimate a proportional hazards model for the 
decision to begin offering merit aid in each academic year.  Between each observed 
time period, institutions have the choice to continue not to offer merit aid or to begin 
offering merit aid.  This decision is modeled as a function of an institution’s own 
characteristics in the beginning of the time period and how these characteristics 
interact with those of peer institutions.   
Following the hypotheses outlined above there are two measures of particular 
interest.  If colleges notice that they are enrolling high ability students at a lower rate 
than their peer institutions, or in other words are experiencing slower growth in their 
median SAT scores than peer colleges, they may offer merit aid awards to increase 
their yield of high ability students.  Lower tier colleges may want to increase the 
quality of their student body, but could also have trouble filling their freshman classes 
and therefore may respond to low enrollment growth by introducing a merit aid 
program.  To investigate these two relationships I include indicators of whether the 
institution had lower growth in either median SAT scores or total undergraduate 
enrollment than their peer institutions and then include interactions of both measures 
with indicators for the tier of the college37. 
                                                 
37
 As none of the institutions in the sample have started offering merit aid at the beginning of the sample 
period, their “spells” of not offering aid are already in progress.  The proportional hazards model takes 
this into account, assigning all schools the same start date of 1960.  The results are not sensitive to 
changes in this start date.  The estimations also take account of the fact that the “spell” is right-censored 
for Never schools as we never observe their switch to merit aid. 
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Table 4.2: Probability of offering Merit Aid - Hazard Ratios from proportional hazards model estimation 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
 50 SAT Pts 100 SAT Pts 200 Miles 200 Miles & 100 SAT Pts 
Expenditures/Student 0.803*** 0.801*** 0.806*** 0.803*** 
 
[0.068] [0.068] [0.067] [0.068] 
Bottom Tier 0.728 0.689 1.163 0.744 
 
[0.281] [0.274] [0.696] [0.292] 
Top Tier 0.528 0.519 0.884 0.521 
 
[0.250] [0.252] [0.542] [0.253] 
Lower SAT Growth than Peers 2.015* 2.271** 2.697 2.216* 
 
[0.829] [0.938] [1.641] [0.911] 
Lower SAT Growth than Peers X Top Tier 0.436 0.482 0.183** 0.466 
 
[0.235] [0.261] [0.124] [0.252] 
Lower SAT Growth than Peers X Bottom 
Tier 0.477 0.579 0.418 0.522 
 
[0.291] [0.333] [0.294] [0.299] 
Lower UG Growth than Peers 0.656 0.682 0.899 0.657 
 
[0.276] [0.288] [0.369] [0.276] 
Lower UG Growth than Peers X Top Tier 1.342 1.376 1.752 1.396 
 
[0.739] [0.759] [0.998] [0.771] 
Lower UG Growth than Peers X Bottom 
Tier 1.498 1.69 1.187 1.489 
 
[0.811] [0.916] [0.671] [0.804] 
Observations 1262 1262 1262 1262 
Note: Standard errors in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  Also includes controls for 
Common Application status, and University.  
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Hazard ratios from estimations of the probability of beginning to offer merit 
aid with several different peer group definitions are reported in Table 4.2.  Column 1  
(2) of Table 4.2 defines peer institutions as those with median SAT scores within a 50 
(100) point band of the focus institution’s own median SAT scores.  Column 3 defines 
the peer institutions using a distance metric – including all private four-year 
institutions located within 200 miles of the focus institution.  Column 4 combines 
these two types of peer group measures and defines peers as all institutions with 
median SAT scores within a 100 point band of the focus institution and also within a 
200 mile radius.  The results seem not to be very sensitive to the peer group definition.  
Colleges that are experiencing slower growth in median SAT scores as compared to 
their peer institutions are significantly more likely to begin offering merit aid in that 
time period.  When peer group is defined only by distance top tier colleges are less 
likely to begin offering merit aid if they are experiencing low growth in their SAT 
scores.  However, for top tier institutions it is unlikely that this is the correct peer 
group to consider – top tier institutions compete on a national scale for students.  
Although anecdotally it appears that some colleges, in particular lower tier colleges, 
may be using merit aid as a way to fill their classes, low enrollment growth as 
compared to peer institutions does not have a significant effect on the probability of 
beginning a merit aid program.  Therefore it seems that colleges are strategically using 
merit aid as a way to stay competitive in the market for high ability students, and these 
results largely confirm the common hypothesis for the use of merit aid.  
 
B. The Effects of Merit Aid on Institutional Characteristics 
The descriptive statistics in the previous section suggest that for this sample of 
four-year colleges and universities, there have been significant changes in the 
variables describing the student bodies, costs and spending on faculty over the sample 
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period, and that some of these changes may have followed the introduction of merit-
based financial aid by the institutions.  In order to examine this more closely I estimate 
the relationship between the number of years a college or university has offered merit 
aid, and the outcome variables of interest.  One might expect that if there are impacts 
on the distribution of students or institutional spending, these effects may not be 
constant over time once the school has decided to offer aid.  There are a number of 
reasonable scenarios for the time pattern of the possible effects.  Institutions might 
have an immediate response in terms of spending that over time may fade away as 
they find alternate funding sources for their merit awards.  In contrast, there may not 
be an immediate effect if schools anticipate offering merit aid and have an alternate 
funding source in mind that is depleted over time leading to a need to cut spending in 
other areas in order to continue funding merit awards.  Therefore, it seems most 
reasonable to allow a fairly flexible form for the effect of merit aid over time, rather 
than to take a difference-in-differences approach.   
To allow for these possible nonlinearities, the model is estimated as a function 
of a series of indicators for the time elapsed since merit aid was first introduced.  
Quadratic time trends are also included to account for the common changes in the 
variables of interest over the sample period.  These trends are allowed to differ for 
Change and Never institutions, as the types of schools that choose to begin offering 
merit aid during the sample period are often on quite different trajectories for the time 
period.  Institutional fixed effects are included, as well as time-varying variables such 
as expenditures per student, percent residential, urbanicity, and whether the institution 
uses the common application in their admissions process.  In order to investigate how 
the effect of offering merit aid may differ for colleges of different initial quality, 
  103
variables indicating how long a college has had merit aid were interacted with 
indicators for tier38.    
In the previous section I have just shown that the decision to begin offering 
merit aid is endogenous, and therefore the effects estimated in this section should not 
be interpreted as causal estimates.  However, the estimations do control for institution 
fixed effects and allow for differential time trends, hopefully capturing much of the 
differences in the types of institutions that begin offering merit aid and those that do 
not yet.  Perhaps most importantly, what we are most interested in examining is how 
these outcome variables have changed following the introduction of a merit aid policy, 
not how these variables might change if a private four-year college were “forced” to 
exogenously adopt a merit aid policy as this is very unlikely to occur.  
 Table 4.3 shows the results of Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimations of 
how the composition of the student body changes in the years following the 
introduction of a merit aid policy.  Column 1 shows how the changes in the percent of 
the student body that is low-income, as proxied by the percent receiving Pell grants, 
has changed as merit-based financial aid was introduced for the institutions in the 
sample.  There does not seem to be a significant immediate effect following the 
introduction of merit aid for middle and top tier institutions.  However, there is an 
increase in the share of students that receive Pell Grants at bottom tier institutions in 
the first five years following the policy change.  A negative relationship begins to take 
shape at middle and top tier colleges three to five years after adoption, and the percent 
of Pell grant students at schools that have offered merit aid for six to ten years is 
roughly 5 percentage points lower than for these schools before they started offering 
aid.  As the time elapsed since introduction of merit aid increases to ten years or  
                                                 
38
 Alternative median SAT cutoffs were used to test for sensitivity of results to tier assignment, but all 
results are robust to changing the tier cutoffs by 20 points in any direction. 
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Table 4.3: Effects of a Merit aid policy on student body demographics 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  % Pell % Black 
% 
Hispanic % Asian 
% Int'l 
Fresh. 
Merit < 2yrs -0.77 -0.52 -0.047 -0.177 -0.524 
  [1.027] [0.616] [0.242] [0.360] [0.836] 
 X Bottom Tier 3.216** 1.730** -0.103 -0.074 1.899* 
 
 
[1.311] [0.791] [0.311] [0.462] [1.073] 
 X Top Tier -0.247 0.061 0.021 -0.185 1.044 
  [1.302] [0.764] [0.300] [0.446] [0.980] 
Merit 3-5 yrs -2.166** -1.066* -0.045 -0.181 -0.827 
  [1.002] [0.587] [0.230] [0.342] [0.747] 
 X Bottom Tier 3.312*** 0.764 -0.14 -0.612 1.888** 
 
 
[1.176] [0.694] [0.272] [0.405] [0.955] 
 X Top Tier 0.37 0.582 0.378 0.087 1.765** 
  [1.170] [0.677] [0.266] [0.395] [0.834] 
Merit 6-10yrs -5.073*** -1.554** -0.438* -0.327 1.073 
  [1.074] [0.645] [0.253] [0.376] [0.799] 
 X Bottom Tier 4.125*** 2.539*** 0.025 -0.661* 1.293 
 
 
[1.067] [0.647] [0.254] [0.378] [0.870] 
 X Top Tier 0.516 0.515 1.005*** 0.125 -0.527 
  [1.074] [0.639] [0.251] [0.373] [0.779] 
Merit >10yrs -6.141*** -2.192*** -0.590* -0.047 0.186 
  [1.385] [0.836] [0.328] [0.488] [1.024] 
 X Bottom Tier 4.358*** 4.017*** 0.019 -1.138*** 1.681* 
 
 
[1.183] [0.722] [0.284] [0.421] [0.974] 
 X Top Tier -1.504 0.603 0.991*** -0.272 0.128 
  [1.223] [0.728] [0.286] [0.425] [0.881] 
Observations 2493 2251 2251 2251 1802 
R-squared 0.93 0.99 0.95 0.96 0.58 
Note: All estimations include institution fixed effects and controls for expenditures 
per student, % residential, urbanicity, and whether the institution uses the common 
application, and differential quadratic time trends (Change vs. Never).  
 
greater, the relationship becomes negative for all institutions, but the change is much 
smaller for bottom tier colleges.  Middle and top tier institutions experience a net 
decrease of about 6 percentage points 10 years out, whereas bottom tier institutions 
see a decrease only about 2 percentage points.  Although in the last section I did not 
find evidence that colleges experiencing low enrollment growth were more likely to 
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switch to merit aid, there is anecdotal evidence that this is true, and it is argued that in 
this case there is the possibility of actually increasing the share of Pell Grant recipients 
in conjunction with merit aid.  These results lend some credence to this argument as 
bottom tier institutions have an initial increase in percent Pell, but long-run there is 
still a crowding-out of low-income students.   
 The introduction of merit-based financial aid is associated with a decrease in 
the percentage of Black students enrolled at colleges in the top two tiers.  As with 
percent Pell, there seems to be little immediate effect, but three to five years after 
adoption of merit aid there is a decrease in percent Black by about 1.5 percentage 
points at both top and middle tier colleges.  Schools in the top two tiers continue to 
experience a decrease in the percentage of students that are Black with a total decline 
of about 2 percentage points after 10 years of offering merit aid.  Bottom tier colleges 
experience an increase in percentage of Black students of about 2 percentage points 
after having offered merit aid for more than 10 years, suggesting that Black students 
are being redistributed from top tier colleges to bottom tier colleges as a result of merit 
aid programs. 
 The results show that although following the introduction of merit aid percent 
Black falls in the top two tiers and rises in the bottom tier, there are only very small 
changes in percent Hispanic across the tiers.   Ten years following the switch to merit 
aid there seems to be a decrease of about 0.5 percentage points at institutions in the 
bottom two tiers, and a corresponding increase of about 1 percentage point at top tier 
institutions. The introduction of merit aid is associated with a decrease in percent 
Asian at the institutions in the bottom tier, but no change for the top two tiers.  The fall 
in percent Asian at the bottom two tiers is quite small with a decrease of 0.7 
percentage points three to five years after adoption and a decrease of about 1.3 
percentage points ten years out.   
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 One possible way for institutions to increase tuition revenues in order to help 
fund the adoption of a merit-based financial aid policy is for these schools to enroll 
more freshmen from outside of the United States.  International students generally 
receive little to no financial aid and therefore are much more likely to pay the full 
posted tuition.  Column 5 of Table 4.3 provides evidence that this might be a strategy 
some institutions are employing.  Middle and top tier schools experience an increase 
in enrollment of international freshmen of about 2 percentage points 3-5 years 
following the introduction of merit aid, with a slightly larger increase at bottom tier 
colleges (3.5 ppts).  Percent foreign then goes back to pre-merit levels ten years after 
adoption of merit aid for middle and top tier institutions, and the increase at bottom 
tier institutions falls slightly to 1.7 ppts.   
 Table 4.4 displays the results of estimating how successful the practice of 
offering merit aid has been at increasing median SAT scores and enrollment of high 
ability students, increasing the size of applicant pools and the number of enrolled 
freshmen, as well as the effect of merit aid on admit and yield rates.  The results in 
column 1 indicate that for all schools the introduction of merit-based financial aid is 
followed by an increase in median SAT scores for the entering class.  Top tier colleges 
actually experience drops in SAT scores in the first two years following the switch to 
merit aid, likely due to the fact that the institutions in this category that are most likely 
to begin offering merit aid are those that were having trouble attracting high ability 
students at the same rate as their peers, as shown in the previous section.  However, 
these institutions rebound somewhat, and return to pre-merit levels and possibly 
experience slight gains in median SAT scores 10 years out.  For middle tier colleges, 
there is a lag with the effect arising about three to five following introduction of merit 
aid, and leading to an increase in median SAT scores of about 22 points, a fairly 
modest increase.  Ten years out this effect rises to 35 points.  It may be that it takes a  
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Table 4.4: Effects of a Merit Aid policy on admissions and student body 
characteristics 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  
Median 
SAT SATQ75 
# 
Freshmen Applicants 
Admit 
Rate Yield 
Merit < 2yrs 12.322 12.413 0.309 9.086 -3.011* -0.498 
  [8.715] [8.949] [13.494] [142.611] [1.799] [1.862] 
 X Bottom Tier -4.974 -10.992 -13.688 50.878 3.007 -3.602 
 
 
[12.325] [12.742] [17.345] [207.498] [2.617] [2.706] 
 X Top Tier -24.536** -16.319 -6.456 -1.043 1.966 2.917 
  [10.369] [10.631] [17.115] [172.390] [2.174] [2.252] 
Merit 3-5 yrs 22.246** 18.433** -12.652 -49.929 -5.020*** 3.361* 
  [8.725] [9.036] [13.420] [143.468] [1.809] [1.880] 
 X Bottom Tier 0.993 6.13 -2.04 238.379 -0.91 -8.568*** 
 
 
[11.043] [11.459] [16.109] [187.054] [2.359] [2.438] 
 X Top Tier -19.330** -5.525 -12.683 119.498 2.808 -3.673* 
  [9.595] [9.911] [16.001] [159.486] [2.011] [2.087] 
Merit 6-10yrs 29.196*** 27.918*** 19.737 -145.356 -5.316*** 3.704* 
  [9.088] [9.397] [14.483] [151.944] [1.916] [1.983] 
 X Bottom Tier 11.379 15.152 -39.886*** 222.124 -0.903 -15.120*** 
 
 
[10.081] [10.452] [14.588] [171.619] [2.164] [2.221] 
 X Top Tier -33.228*** -17.523* -31.137** 391.068*** 3.312* -1.423 
  [8.782] [9.051] [14.661] [146.029] [1.842] [1.907] 
Merit >10yrs 34.498*** 47.604*** 10.96 -58.731 -4.466* -1.985 
  [11.232] [11.647] [19.255] [191.857] [2.420] [2.503] 
 X Bottom Tier -28.495*** -27.672** -32.476** -273.813 0.869 -10.173*** 
 
 
[10.893] [11.353] [16.245] [181.118] [2.284] [2.364] 
 X Top Tier -31.041*** -26.262*** -2.503 353.307** 2.27 5.207** 
  [9.577] [9.907] [16.755] [163.617] [2.064] [2.136] 
Observations 1879 1898 2267 2049 2049 2054 
R-squared 0.95 0.94 0.98 0.98 0.87 0.76 
Note: All estimations include institution fixed effects and controls for expenditures per student, % 
residential, urbanicity, and whether the institution uses the common application, and differential 
quadratic time trends (Change vs. Never).  Estimations in column (3) have a linear trend only.  
 
few cycles of offering merit aid before word gets out and the program begins to attract 
many higher test score students, or that there is some critical mass that must be 
attracted before the median scores will actually rise significantly.  Bottom tier 
institutions experience gains in median SAT scores similar to middle tier colleges 
following the introduction of merit aid.  However, ten years after the introduction of 
the policy, bottom tier colleges have median SAT scores that are only slightly higher 
than before the policy.   
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Merit aid policies are meant to increase the size of the top tail of the ability 
distribution at colleges, so perhaps a better measure of whether colleges have been 
successful in this goal is the 75th percentile SAT score.  Column 2 shows how the 75th 
percentile changes following the introduction of merit aid.  Colleges at all tiers 
experience an increase in these scores following the policy change.  This effect is 
largest for middle tier colleges, with an increase of about 48 points, as compared to 
increases of about 20 points at top and bottom tier colleges ten years following the 
policy change.   
As discussed previously, bottom tier colleges also likely have a second 
incentive for offering merit aid, to increase enrollment.  In column 3, results show that 
bottom tier institutions that have offered merit aid for 10 years or more actually have 
slightly smaller freshmen classes than before they began offering merit aid, by about 
32 students.  Top tier institutions also seem to experience slight decreases in their 
freshmen class sizes 6-10 years following a switch to merit aid.  For both tiers that 
experience changes in freshmen class size it is possible that the use of merit aid has 
allowed the institutions to reach a standing where they can begin to decrease class 
sizes, leading to lower student to faculty ratios and higher quality education.  It is also  
possible for bottom tier colleges that although we did not find evidence for slow 
enrollment growth as an incentive to begin offering merit aid, this is indeed the case 
and perhaps merit aid is not a successful tool to reach this goal.   
 Top tier colleges experience increases in applicant pool size six to ten years 
following the introduction of merit aid.  For the bottom two tiers, applicant pool sizes 
remain unchanged ten years following the policy change. Columns 5 and 6 of Table 
4.4 show the results for the admit rate (calculated as the number of students admitted 
divided by the number of students that applied) and yield (calculated as the number of 
students that enroll divided by the number of students that were granted admission). 
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There is a decrease in the admit rate, about 5 percentage points, in the three to ten 
years following the introduction of merit aid.  This negative relationship remains over 
time with only a slightly decrease in the size of the fall in admit rate, and a slightly 
smaller fall in admit rate for top tier institutions.  Results in column 6 show that the 
introduction of merit aid is followed by an increase in yield rates at middle and top tier 
colleges and a decrease in yield at bottom tier colleges.  For middle tier colleges the 
strategy of using merit-based financial aid to increase enrollment of high-test score 
students seems to be somewhat fruitful given the slight increase in median and 75th 
percentile SAT scores associated with this policy, and increase in overall yield rates.  
Evidence is mixed for the success of merit aid at bottom and top tier colleges.  Bottom 
tier colleges experience an increase in SAT scores but see a fall in freshman 
enrollment.  Top tier colleges see only very slight increases in median SAT scores, but 
larger increases in yield and 75th percentile SAT scores.   
 Table 4.5 examines the relationship between the introduction of merit aid and 
tuition, room & board, and the percentage of the student body that is enrolled full-
time.  All three are measures of direct ways by which an institution could make 
changes in order to fund increases in merit-aid funding. Middle and bottom tier 
colleges experience an increase in tuition rates of 2.7% six to ten years following the 
adoption of a merit aid policy, and this effect increases over time to a 6.5% increase in 
tuition rates ten years out, as compared to before the adoption of merit aid.  In 
contrast, top tier colleges experience decreases in tuition over this time period of about 
5 percentage points 6-10 years following the switch to merit aid and about 3 
percentage points 10 years out.    
 The relationship between a merit aid policy and changes in room & board 
charges is somewhat different from that of tuition charges.  Middle and bottom tier 
colleges see decreases in room & board charges 3-5 following the introduction of  
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Table 4.5: Effects of a Merit Aid Policy on student costs and enrollments 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  
Log 
(Tuition) 
Log 
(Room/Board) 
Log 
(Total Cost) 
% Full-
time Stud. 
Merit < 2yrs 0.014 -0.028 0.004 1.482 
  [0.016] [0.023] [0.014] [0.961] 
 
X Bottom 
Tier -0.02 -0.004 -0.014 -0.23 
 
 
[0.022] [0.031] [0.019] [1.227] 
 X Top Tier -0.016 0.034 0.007 -0.497 
  [0.021] [0.028] [0.017] [1.219] 
Merit 3-5 yrs 0 -0.108*** -0.028** 2.687*** 
  [0.015] [0.021] [0.013] [0.938] 
 
X Bottom 
Tier 0 0.029 0.001 -1.840* 
 
 
[0.020] [0.029] [0.018] [1.101] 
 X Top Tier -0.026 0.109*** 0.030* -1.851* 
  [0.020] [0.027] [0.016] [1.096] 
Merit 6-10yrs 0.027* -0.082*** -0.001 3.807*** 
  [0.015] [0.020] [0.012] [1.006] 
 
X Bottom 
Tier -0.015 0.02 0.006 -0.709 
 
 
[0.018] [0.026] [0.016] [0.999] 
 X Top Tier -0.071*** 0.101*** -0.001 -2.513** 
  [0.018] [0.024] [0.014] [1.006] 
Merit >10yrs 0.065*** -0.018 0.027* 8.459*** 
  [0.017] [0.024] [0.015] [1.297] 
 
X Bottom 
Tier -0.027 0.014 0.031* -2.195** 
 
 
[0.020] [0.029] [0.018] [1.107] 
 X Top Tier -0.097*** 0.04 -0.02 -7.471*** 
  [0.020] [0.027] [0.016] [1.145] 
Observations 2262 1820 1795 2517 
R-squared 0.98 0.88 0.98 0.92 
Note: All estimations include institution fixed effects and controls for expenditures per 
student, % residential, urbanicity, and whether the institution uses the common 
application, and quadratic time trends.  Estimations in columns (2) & (3) have a linear 
trend only.  Estimation in column (4) allows for differential time trends by 
Change/Never 
merit aid, but this change reverses such that ten years following the policy 
introduction room & board levels are similar to before the policy.  Top tier institutions 
do not experience changes in room & board charges following a switch to merit aid.  
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Column 3 shows how these changes in tuition and room & board costs affect total 
student costs.  The result is that for all colleges there is an overall increase in total 
student costs by ten years out.  Bottom tier colleges experience slightly higher 
increases in total costs of about 5 percent versus 2.7 percent for schools in the top two 
tiers.  
Another way in which institutions could increase tuition revenues in order to 
balance increases in merit aid expenditures would be to enroll more full-time students.  
This seems to be a successful strategy for schools at all levels, although the 
relationship is strongest for the middle tier.  Three to five years following the 
introduction of a merit aid program the percentage of students that are enrolled full-
time increases by about 3 percentage points at middle tier colleges and 1 percentage 
point at bottom and top tier colleges.  Middle tier colleges continue to see increases in 
the percentage of students enrolled full-time with an overall net increase of about 8.5 
percentage points ten years following the policy change.  After the immediate bump, 
top tier colleges return to original levels.  Bottom tier colleges also experience 
increases in enrollment of full-time students and ten years following the policy change 
have student populations that are about 6 percentage points more likely to be enrolled 
full-time.   
 Table 4.6 shows results of the effect of merit aid on faculty salaries and the 
proportion of faculty that are employed part-time.  Bottom tier colleges and 
universities experience an increase in faculty salaries at the assistant professor level of 
about 5% immediately following the introduction of merit aid.  This increases to about 
6% ten years following the policy change.  However, there doesn’t seem to be a 
relationship between the policy change and assistant faculty salaries at top or middle 
tier colleges.  Middle and bottom tier colleges experience increases in associate faculty 
salaries of about 5 percent ten years following the switch, but top tier colleges  
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Table 4.6: Effects of a Merit Aid policy on Faculty employment and salaries 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  
Log (avg asst. 
salary) 
Log (avg assc. 
salary) 
Log (avg prof 
salary) 
Pct. PT 
Faculty 
Merit < 2yrs -0.012 0.025* -0.009 -1.271 
  [0.019] [0.015] [0.023] [3.047] 
 
X Bottom 
Tier 0.049** 0.005 0.067** 1.23 
 
 
[0.025] [0.020] [0.030] [4.021] 
 X Top Tier -0.005 -0.037** -0.006 -1.38 
  [0.024] [0.019] [0.029] [3.937] 
Merit 3-5 yrs -0.008 0.041*** 0.018 -1.274 
  [0.019] [0.015] [0.023] [3.068] 
 
X Bottom 
Tier 0.056** -0.008 0.012 -1.139 
 
 
[0.023] [0.018] [0.028] [3.763] 
 X Top Tier -0.026 -0.062*** -0.047* -5.582 
  [0.022] [0.018] [0.027] [3.632] 
Merit 6-10yrs -0.007 0.040** 0.027 -3.018 
  [0.021] [0.016] [0.025] [3.355] 
 
X Bottom 
Tier 0.047** -0.013 0.005 2.349 
 
 
[0.021] [0.016] [0.025] [3.377] 
 X Top Tier -0.026 -0.058*** -0.063** -5.633* 
  [0.020] [0.016] [0.024] [3.319] 
Merit >10yrs -0.015 0.051** 0.023 -8.223* 
  [0.027] [0.021] [0.032] [4.374] 
 
X Bottom 
Tier 0.057** -0.02 0.025 0.113 
 
 
[0.022] [0.018] [0.027] [3.445] 
 X Top Tier -0.022 -0.058*** -0.045* -2.108 
  [0.023] [0.018] [0.027] [3.411] 
Observations 1876 1873 1881 1115 
R-squared 0.88 0.93 0.92 0.72 
Note: All estimations include institution fixed effects and controls for expenditures 
per student, % residential, urbanicity, and whether the institution uses the common 
application, and quadratic time trends.  Estimation in column (4) has a linear trend 
only. Estimations allow for differential time trends by Change/Never.  
experience decreases of almost 6 percent.  Similarly, there is a positive relationship 
between merit aid and full professor salary levels at bottom tier colleges in the first 
five years following the adoption of merit aid.  However, average full professor 
salaries decrease by about 5 percent at top tier colleges ten years following the 
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introduction of merit aid.  Middle and bottom tier colleges are likely trying to increase 
their overall quality by simultaneously attracting more high-ability students through 
the use of merit aid, and by retaining and attracting high-quality faculty through higher 
salaries resulting in the positive relationship identified here.  Top tier colleges may be 
spending less on salary increases for tenured faculty in order to help fund merit aid 
awards and therefore attract more high ability students to their institution.   
 Ten years following the introduction of merit aid, the colleges and universities 
in the whole sample experience a decrease in part-time faculty of 8 percentage points. 
It is encouraging that these findings point to an increase in the quality of the faculty 
(through the use of more full-time faculty members) associated with the use of merit-
based aid, rather than a decrease in quality.  Therefore, although colleges may need to 
divert funds to cover increased expenditures on merit aid, they are likely not doing so 
by employing more part-time faculty members which may lead to decreases in 
instructional quality. 
 A potential concern regarding the results is that the measure of having had 
merit aid for ten years or more not only captures effects ten years out but specifically 
for colleges that adopted a merit aid policy early enough to have ten years of data 
following.  This should not be a huge concern for this particular sample as over 90% 
of the schools that switch to merit during the time period do so before 1997 at a fairly 
steady rate and therefore have more than ten years of observations following the 
switch.  However, in an effort to test whether the results shown here are specific to 
“early-adopters” I split the sample into those who adopted early (pre-1995) and late-
adopters (1996 and on).  Although you cannot identify effects 10 years out for the late-
adopters (of which there are very few), the patterns regarding changes in the variables 
of interest in the years following a switch to merit aid are qualitatively and 
quantitatively very similar to the results shown for the whole sample.  Therefore it 
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does not seem that early-adopters experienced very different changes in outcomes than 
more recent adopters. 
 
V. Conclusion  
 An increase in the use of merit-based financial aid by private colleges and 
universities has prompted many questions regarding the effects of this type of policy 
on the socioeconomic and racial composition of the student body, as well as other 
areas of educational expenditures and charges.  Some argue that merit aid will lead to 
a crowding-out of low-income and minority students, who on average earn lower test 
scores and are less likely to receive a merit award.  Others feel that merit aid will 
allow colleges to enroll more high-ability students that are able to pay an amount close 
to full tuition thereby increasing overall tuition revenues which can then be used to 
increase the funding of need-based financial aid awards.  This paper uses data from the 
College Board, IPEDS and on Pell Grant recipients to examine this question, as well 
as to examine what factors cause institutions to begin offering merit aid and to assess 
how successful merit aid is at increasing the median test scores of entering students 
and/or increasing freshman enrollment.  In addition, this study examines how a switch 
to a merit aid policy could affect the costs students bear in the form of tuition and 
room & board, as well as the spending on salaries and full-time faculty which can 
have impacts on the quality of the education provided at a college. 
 Colleges adopt a policy of awarding merit-based aid in response to low growth 
in median SAT scores of their incoming classes as compared to their peer institutions, 
and therefore to remain competitive with peer institutions at recruiting high-ability 
students.  The results of this study show that most private colleges and universities 
have been successful at increasing the 75th percentile SAT scores of their incoming 
freshman class through the use of merit aid.  However, these gains are fairly modest – 
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an average gain of about 47 points for the middle tier colleges and 20 point gains for 
bottom and top tier colleges ten years following the adoption of the policy. 
 The use of merit aid is associated with changes in the socioeconomic and racial 
composition of the student body.  The percentage of students receiving Pell grants 
decreases by about 6 percentage points at colleges in the top two tiers and 2 
percentage points in the bottom tier ten years following the introduction of the merit 
aid policy,.  The use of merit aid is also associated with a decrease in the percentage of 
students that are Black at the top two tiers of about 2 percentage points.  Bottom tier 
colleges experience a slight increase in international student enrollments following the 
introduction of merit aid.  As international students more often than not pay full tuition 
and costs, this may be one mechanism by which these colleges can increase tuition 
revenues to balance the increased outlay on financial aid created by merit aid awards.   
 The introduction of merit aid policies are accompanied by increases in tuition 
at middle and bottom tier colleges of about 7%, a fairly substantial increase, resulting 
in a 3 percent increase in net cost.  The posted tuition levels at top tier colleges either 
do not change following the introduction of a merit aid policy or decrease slightly, but 
total costs rise by about 3%.  Bottom tier colleges experience slightly higher increases 
in total costs of about 5 percent. 
 There is some evidence that the use of merit aid leads to a decrease in spending 
in other areas, in particular on faculty salaries at top tier colleges.  Top tier colleges 
see decreases in spending on associate and full professor salaries following the 
introduction of merit aid, which could result in higher turnover, and increased 
difficulty of recruiting high quality new faculty members.  Middle tier colleges 
accompany the use of merit aid with increases in spending on associate faculty 
salaries, which may help these colleges to retain and attract more high-quality 
professors.  Bottom tier colleges experiences increases in faculty salaries at the 
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assistant and associate level.  These increases following the switch to merit aid may 
signal a move by the institutions to increase quality at both the student level and the 
faculty level.  At all colleges, the introduction of a merit aid policy is associated with 
an increase in the percentage of faculty that is employed full-time.  As Ehrenberg and 
Zhang (2005) and Bettinger & Long (2004) find that a decrease in the use of part-time 
faculty has a positive impact on student persistence, this move by colleges should have 
a positive impact on educational quality.   
 Overall, this study finds that merit aid programs are modestly successful at 
increasing test scores.  Of course as mentioned earlier, these results must be 
accompanied by a disclaimer.  As shown in the first section of results, the decision to 
begin offering merit aid is endogenous.  Therefore, all results are suggestive of what is 
happening at private four-year colleges and universities following the introduction of a 
merit aid policy, but should not be interpreted as causal estimates.  In addition, the 
sample used in the estimations is fairly small and selected, so there may be significant 
effects that this study is not able to identify.  Keeping these caveats in mind, it is still 
somewhat worrisome, given the already low levels of representation of low-income 
and minority students at four-year colleges, to find that the introduction of a merit aid 
policy is associated with a decrease in the percentage of low-income and Black 
students, particularly at the more selective institutions in the sample.  This crowding-
out may be due to an increase in merit aid spending at the expense of need-based 
financial aid.  In conjunction with the rising costs to students following the switch to 
merit, this relationship is something that needs more research.  Institutions with merit 
aid policies may want to consider the unintended consequences of these programs, as 
they seem to be at odds with the current move to increase representation of low-
income and minority students at four-year colleges and universities. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
SUMMARY AND FUTURE WORK 
This dissertation has examined three questions in higher education economics 
linked by a focus on low-income and minority students.  The under-representation of 
low-income and minority students at selective colleges and universities is a salient 
policy issue, and understanding how to increase enrollment of these students and 
ensure their success during college will be very helpful as we move forward.  It is also 
important to examine how other institutional policies can affect the enrollment of 
these students and the quality of the institutions they attend.  Hopefully the results of 
this dissertation can help with all of these goals. 
 The second chapter examined the decision to apply to a selective college or 
university and identified proximity to a selective college as a significant factor.  The 
results suggest that this is not just a simple cost or convenience story, but rather that 
there may be some informational benefit to living near to a selective institution that 
increases the likelihood of applying to one anywhere, not necessarily the closest.  In 
order to attract more low-income students to apply, recruiters should focus their efforts 
on areas geographically distant from selective colleges and universities.  Students in 
these areas might benefit from increased availability of information regarding the 
opportunities available at selective colleges and universities.   
 The results of chapter two help to point out one important factor in the 
application decision, but there is still room to examine other potentially significant 
factors.  How does the racial and income composition of a student’s high school 
impact on his/her application decisions?  The composition of the high school a student 
attends can affect the social networks that they form, which in turn could affect their 
educational outcomes.  Additionally, students’ decisions may be affected by the 
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composition and quality of the body of teachers they interact with in high school.  
There is a growing literature on the importance of role models in education, and this is 
another area in which role models could potentially be very influential.  
 The third chapter investigates how measures of academic and social fit impact 
on the educational success of students enrolled at selective colleges and universities.  
The findings suggest that the grades and persistence of students with large gaps 
between their own test scores and those of their peers are not greatly affected, 
although the impacts are slightly larger for low-income students.  This non-effect of a 
“mismatch” in academic fit seems mostly due to a successful selection process on the 
parts of the students and the institutions themselves.  Instrumental variables 
estimations suggest that there is a much larger effect on grades for test score gaps once 
this selection is accounted for, indicating that admissions offices should continue to 
use other sources of information when evaluating the probability of success for 
students with low test scores in their admissions process.   
Peer group size seems to have little effect on grades or persistence, but does 
impact on college major choice.  As the choice of one’s major, and subsequent 
occupation, can greatly affect earnings, these results further our understanding of this 
decision-making process.  More research in this area would be beneficial and help 
policymakers to address the ongoing under-representation of women and minorities in 
science, technology, engineering and mathematics fields during and after college. 
Notably, after controlling for background, institutional, and academic and 
social fit characteristics, Black and Hispanic students continue to earn lower grades 
and have lower six-year graduation rates from the selective schools in the data set.  
This is a worrying finding, and more research is needed to discover why this is so and 
if there are policies that institutions could adopt to address this issue. 
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 Finally, the results of chapter four show that one institutional policy that has 
recently been spreading, merit aid, can have unintended consequences.  This type of 
policy, while modestly successful at raising the quality of the student body, has been 
followed by decreases in the enrollment of low-income and minority students as well 
as changes in spending on faculty salaries and increases in student costs.  These 
changes in spending and costs could be detrimental to institutional quality and student 
outcomes.  In a time when the higher education community is concerned with issues of 
access for low-income and minority students, it is important to understand how current 
and new policies can impact on this goal.  Other recent policies gaining popularity, 
such as SAT-optional admissions policies, and the end of Early Decision at many 
schools, should also be analyzed to see what impact, if any, they have on the 
enrollment and success of low-income and minority students.   
 This dissertation has examined three important questions regarding the post-
secondary education experiences of low-income and minority students.  Hopefully the 
results will add to the literature and our understanding of the factors affecting the 
educational success of these students.  Additionally, these questions have paved the 
way to many other interesting and important questions in this area that future research 
can examine.   
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APPENDIX 
 
Table A3.1: Multinomial Logit coefficient estimates for major choice in senior 
year (NLSF) 
 
        
 STEM Humanities Soc. Sci. Bus./Econ. 
Black -0.106 -0.127 0.297 -0.21 
 
(0.174) (0.223) (0.134)** (0.163) 
Hispanic 0.043 -0.41 -0.212 0.182 
 
(0.114) (0.197)** (0.127)* (0.147) 
Asian -0.155 0.061 0.208 -0.289 
 (0.123) (0.251) (0.114)* (0.19) 
HS GPA 0.841 0.37 0.454 0.235 
 
(0.143)*** (0.326) (0.157)*** (0.214) 
Private HS -0.058 -0.063 0.1 -0.025 
 
(0.068) (0.145) (0.086) (0.114) 
Income <$35,000 0.302 0.452 -0.118 0.633 
 
(0.193) (0.278) (0.262) (0.370)* 
Dist. Below Median -0.227 -0.104 0.104 -0.362 
 
(0.110)** (0.178) (0.132) (0.180)** 
Dist Above Median 0.096 -0.186 -0.123 -0.046 
 
(0.121) (0.136) (0.161) (0.194) 
Pct. Pell Grant 0.002 0.003 -0.01 0.01 
 
(0.008) (0.009) (0.004)** (0.009) 
Low. Inc. X Pct. Pell -0.005 -0.019 0.018 -0.021 
 
(0.009) (0.011)* (0.014) (0.018) 
Constant -4.026 -6.343 -4.717 -2.690 
  
(1.036)*** (0.546)*** (1.505 (1.635)* 
Observations 690 260 570 360 
Notes: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. All 
columns include controls for gender, parent's education, exp/student, institution type 
and Pct. of Majors within each field from Institution. Robust standard errors in 
parentheses 
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Table A3.2: Multinomial Logit coefficient estimates for major choice in senior year (NLSF) 
 Black  Hispanic 
 STEM Humanities Soc. Sci. Bus./Econ.  STEM Humanities Soc. Sci. Bus/Econ 
HS GPA 1.511 0.347 0.651 0.449  0.423 -0.312 0.061 0.14 
 
(0.293)*** (0.545) (0.308)** (0.41)  (0.481) (0.451) (0.303) (0.477) 
Private HS -0.044 -0.713 0.115 -0.031  0.085 0.056 0.106 0.184 
 
(0.229) (0.373)* (0.213) (0.238)  (0.216) (0.326) (0.256) (0.358) 
Income <$35,000 -0.001 1.047 0.168 0.754  0.645 -0.36 0.14 0.876 
 
(0.431) (0.645) (0.391) (0.79)  (0.374)* (0.768) (0.461) (0.462)* 
Dist. Below 
Median -0.106 -0.196 -0.017 -0.313  -0.089 -0.303 -0.012 -0.036 
 
(0.169) (0.32) (0.168) (0.209)  (0.256) (0.478) (0.318) (0.335) 
Dist Above 
Median 0.099 -0.343 -0.351 -0.168  0.285 0.408 -0.077 -0.621 
 
(0.323) (0.405) (0.328) (0.527)  (0.205) (0.457) (0.299) (0.39) 
Pct. Pell Grant -0.023 -0.014 -0.006 0.092  0.014 -0.007 -0.011 0.016 
 
(0.014)* (0.016) (0.011) (0.016)***  (0.012) (0.02) (0.013) (0.015) 
Low. Inc. X Pct. 
Pell 0.003 -0.049 -0.011 -0.03  -0.01 -0.006 -0.003 0 
 
(0.025) (0.04) (0.02) (0.036)  (0.012) (0.028) (0.021) (0.023) 
Pct Own Race -0.008 0.007 -0.004 0.007  0.001 0.131 0.14 -0.067 
 
(0.003)** (0.006) (0.003) (0.003)**  (0.036) (0.083) (0.054)*** (0.089) 
Constant -4.472 -6.510 -1.788 -5.683  -6.189 -1.841 -1.367 -3.660 
  
(2.941)* (3.155)** (2.032) (1.911)***   (2.817)** (4.829) -2.173 (3.787) 
Observations 140 60 180 70   140 70 150 70 
Notes: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. All columns include controls for gender, parent's 
education, exp/student, institution type and Pct. of Majors within each field from Institution. Robust standard errors in 
parentheses 
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Table A3.2 Continued 
 Asian  White 
 STEM Humanities Soc. Sci. Bus/Econ  STEM Humanities Soc. Sci. Bus/Econ 
HS GPA 0.597 0.162 0.523 -0.189  0.724 1.177 0.303 0.56 
 
(0.323)* (0.642) (0.705) (0.436)  (0.269)*** (0.391)*** (0.389) (0.287)* 
Private HS -0.08 0.319 0.257 -0.08  -0.158 -0.052 0.042 -0.056 
 
(0.27) (0.33) (0.27) (0.249)  (0.203) (0.269) (0.283) (0.288) 
Income <$35,000 0.493 0.073 -0.382 0.396  -0.291 0.327 -1.056 1.784 
 
(0.456) (1.32) (0.325) (0.552)  (0.83) (0.814) (0.905) (1.119) 
Dist. Below Median 0.059 0.694 -0.04 -0.108  -0.145 -0.695 -0.251 -0.868 
 
(0.291) (0.487) (0.347) (0.355)  (0.216) (0.489) (0.214) (0.370)** 
Dist Above Median -0.243 -0.717 -0.092 -0.154  0.039 0.061 0.233 -0.387 
 
(0.337) (0.374)* (0.349) (0.31)  (0.238) (0.326) (0.254) (0.34) 
Pct. Pell Grant 0.006 0.008 -0.048 -0.004  0.025 0.018 -0.016 -0.001 
 
(0.01) (0.014) (0.013)*** (0.008)  (0.010)** (0.017) (0.008)* (0.013) 
Low. Inc. X Pct. 
Pell -0.012 -0.023 0.048 -0.028  0.022 0.021 0.081 -0.13 
 
(0.014) (0.07) (0.013)*** (0.018)  (0.034) (0.038) (0.030)*** (0.098) 
Pct Own Race -0.032 -0.059 0.033 -0.001  0.012 -0.022 0.002 0.04 
 
(0.007)*** (0.014)*** (0.008)*** (0.008)  (0.006)** (0.013)* (0.006) (0.016)** 
Constant -8.065 -14.34 -3.253 -2.405  -6.148 -3.641 -1.770 -9.211 
  
(2.790)*** (4.590)*** (2.716) (2.972)   (2.604)** (5.099) (2.689) (4.575)** 
Observations 210 60 110 120   200 80 130 100 
Notes: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. All columns include controls for gender, parent's 
education, exp/student, institution type and Pct. of Majors within each field from Institution. Robust standard errors in parentheses 
 
